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PUNISHING SEXUAL FANTASY
ANDREW GILDEN*
ABSTRACT
The Internet has created unprecedented opportunities for adults
and teenagers to explore their sexual identities, but it has also
created new ways for the law to monitor and punish a diverse range
of taboo sexual communication. A young mother loses custody of her
two children due to sexually explicit Facebook conversations. A
teenager is prosecuted for child pornography crimes after sending a
naked selfie to her teenage boyfriend. An NYPD officer is convicted
for conspiracy to kidnap several women based on conversations he
had on a “dark fetish” fantasy website. In each of these cases, online
sexual exploration and fantasy easily convert into damning evidence
admissible in court. 
This Article reveals a widespread and overlooked pattern of harsh-
ly punishing individuals for exploring their sexual fantasies on the
Internet. It shows, for the first time, that judges and juries have re-
peatedly conflated sexual fantasy with harmful criminal conduct,
have largely been dismissive of fantasy-based defenses, and have
relaxed evidentiary standards to prejudice individuals whose desires
provoke disapproval or disgust. Even as celebrated decisions by the
United States Supreme Court provide broader constitutional protec-
tion to sexual minorities, this Article shows that actual venues for
exploring sexuality remain on the social and legal margins. Drawing
from recent criminal law, family law, and First Amendment cases,
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this Article shows that courts have struggled to adapt free speech,
privacy, and due process principles to the uncomfortable realities of
the digital environment.
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INTRODUCTION
The contemporary legal treatment of sexuality contains an
overlooked paradox. By most accounts, over the past two decades
the law has embraced a broader range of sexual identities and
practices. In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy proclaimed that
the Constitution protects the liberties of all persons “to define and
express their identity.”1 At the same time, however, the law remains
deeply uncomfortable with, and often outright hostile to, situations
in which people actually explore and express their sexual identities
and desires. A divorcing mother loses custody of her children for
having sexual conversations with an ex-boyfriend.2 A teenage
lesbian couple is prosecuted for child pornography crimes after
sharing nude photos.3 A police officer is convicted for a kidnapping
conspiracy based entirely on conversations via a “dark fetish” role-
playing website.4 
Sexual identity may indeed be protected in a fully blossomed,
clearly articulated form—at the point where two people are ready to
get married or otherwise pursue a “personal bond that is more
enduring.”5 Nonetheless, the actual process of coming to terms with
one’s sexual identity often entails extensive fantasizing, experimen-
tation, education, and social interaction.6 And these processes are
often far less romantic, much less “dignified,” and far less “PG” than
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015); see also, e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs.,
740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based on
sexual orientation). 
2. See Borden v. Borden, 167 So. 3d 238, 242-43 (Miss. 2014).
3. See Beth Slovic, Sext Crimes: Oregon Has a Name for Teens who Take Dirty Photos
with Their Cell Phones: Child Pornographer, WILLAMETTE WEEK (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.
wweek.com/portland/article-16544-sext-crimes.html [https://perma.cc/UVH4-Q23L].
4. See United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff ’d in part and rev’d
in part, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015). See generally Thea Johnson & Andrew Gilden, Common
Sense and the Cannibal Cop, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 313 (2015); Andrew Gilden, Second
Circuit Sides with the “Cannibal Cop,” PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 3, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/12 /second-circuit-sides-with-the-cannibal-cop.html [https://
perma.cc/QZ3D-HC7P].
5. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Michael W. Ross, Typing, Doing, and Being: Sexuality and the Internet, 42
J. SEX RES. 342, 343-44 (2005); see also infra Part I.
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envisioned by the evolving legal narratives of sexuality.7 When
confronted with day-to-day explorations of sexual fantasy—for
example, sexually explicit stories and conversations, adult social
media profiles, and pornographic images—judges, prosecutors, law
enforcement, and policymakers frequently devalue or punish what
are, for better or worse, formative components of sexual identity.8 
This tension between protected sexual identity and marginalized
sexual fantasy has become particularly acute in the digital context.
The Internet and social media are frequently credited with bringing
needed visibility to sexual inequalities9 and helping LGBT people
understand and come to terms with their identities.10 At the same
time, the dominant legal narrative surrounding the intersection of
Internet and sexuality has focused not on these new opportunities
for self-definition but instead on the dangers of the sexual Internet:
predators, cyberbullies, sexting, and revenge porn.11 In the wake of
panics surrounding Internet pornography, online sexual predators,
and cyberbullying, a large body of laws has emerged to stamp out
nearly all avenues for Internet-mediated sexual harms and to
7. See, e.g., Emily S. Pingel et al., “A Safe Way to Explore”: Reframing Risk on the Inter-
net Amidst Young Gay Men’s Search for Identity, 28 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 453 (2012); Jennifer
Egan, Lonely Gay Teen Seeking Same, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/12/10/magazine/lonely-gay-teen-seeking-same.html [https://perma.cc/8P54-6UT3].
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g., Luke O’Neil, How Facebook Friended Gay Marriage, ESQUIRE (June 26,
2013), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a23253/friending-gay-marriage/ [https://
perma.cc/8CWK-2KNC]; Nancy Scola, The Social-Network Effect That Is Helping Legalize
Gay Marriage, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/
the-social-network-effect-that-is-helping-legalize-gay-marriage/265793/ [https://perma.cc/
5VUC-ZTB7]; How Social Media Created Marriage Equality, SXSW PANELPICKER, http://
panelpicker.sxsw.com/vote/21720 [https://perma.cc/Q8EN-96M7].
10. For instance, LGBT teenagers and young adults can connect with other LGBT people
in relative anonymity, talk frankly and explicitly about their desires, and use those
experiences to gauge and ultimately define their sexual identities—both online and off. See,
e.g., Bradley J. Bond et al., Information-Seeking Practices During the Sexual Development of
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Individuals: The Influence and Effects of Coming Out in a
Mediated Environment, 13 SEXUALITY & CULTURE 32, 43-45 (2009); Samantha DeHaan et al.,
The Interplay Between Online and Offline Explorations of Identity, Relationships, and Sex: A
Mixed-Methods Study with LGBT Youth, 50 J. SEX RES. 421, 430-33 (2013); Pingel et al.,
supra note 7, at 471-73; Ross, supra note 6, at 348-49. 
11.  Kristian Daneback et al., The Internet as a Source of Information About Sexuality, 12
SEX EDUC. 583, 584 (2012) (“[M]uch of the research available in the field so far has focused
on the negative and problematic aspects of using the Internet for sexual purposes and less on
sexual lust, sexual health, sexual joy, and sexual knowledge.” (citation omitted)).
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severely punish individuals who pursue taboo sexual fantasies.12
Often missing from these debates, however, is any acknowledge-
ment of the potential value of exploring sexual desires or the
chilling effect of harshly policing and punishing sexual fantasies.13 
This Article reveals a widespread and overlooked pattern of
harshly punishing individuals for exploring their sexual fantasies
on the Internet. It shows that judges and juries in several areas of
the law repeatedly conflate sexual fantasy with sexual abuse, have
largely been dismissive of both the merits and value of fantasy-
based defenses, and have relaxed evidentiary standards in ways
that particularly prejudice individuals whose desires likely provoke
disapproval or disgust. Moreover, even though crime data consis-
tently show that fears of Internet “stranger danger” are commonly
overstated,14 this Article shows that law enforcement frequently
identify potential sex offenders by enacting Internet users’ taboo
fantasies through extensive, explicit conversations. These practices
may be motivated by the worthy desire to protect women and
children from sexual abuse, but they nevertheless fail to appreciate
the potential impact on free speech, privacy, due process, and the
ability to define and express one’s constitutionally protected iden-
tity.
The Internet undeniably poses risks for vulnerable populations,15
and, as a result, it may be difficult for the law to see anything but
the harm in sexually explicit conversations and content. For in-
stance, it may be extremely difficult for a judge or jury to read a
defendant’s extensive chat room conversations about bondage, sexu-
al assault, sadomasochism, incest, or underage sex without conclud-
ing that he or she poses a real danger or actually intends to engage
in violent, nonconsensual, or otherwise illegal sexual conduct.16 The
Internet provides unprecedented opportunities to indulge in nearly
12. See generally Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and
Social Institutional Reform, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1553 (2014).
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (detailing the
legal precedents that should enable criminalization of cyber harassment); Mary Anne Franks,
Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
224, 245-47 (2011).
16. See infra Part II.
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all forms of sexual fantasy, and its relative anonymity can disinhibit
discussions about even the most taboo topics.17 As a result, the tran-
script of a conversation on a fetish website might go into specific,
painstaking detail about an elaborate kidnapping and cannibalism
plot, and in the courtroom this transcript might look—without
context—comparable to a wiretapped conversation about drug or
weapons trafficking.18 When confronted with such evidence, judges
and juries often are highly skeptical and dismissive of arguments
that these conversations are ultimately all fantasy.19
Nonetheless, there is an important distinction between sexual
fantasy and harmful sexual conduct.20 In many contexts, extensive
discussions of taboo sexual topics are celebrated by popular culture
and squarely protected by the First Amendment—for example,
books like Lolita21 or Fifty Shades of Grey,22 television shows like
Game of Thrones,23 or video games like Grand Theft Auto.24 Even
though the underage sex, sadomasochism, incest, rape, and pros-
titution present in these works would absolutely be criminal if acted
out in real life, there is widely understood to be social value—and
constitutionally protected expression—in airing and openly dis-
cussing the dark side of the human psyche.25 Reading, writing, and
17. See, e.g., Katelyn Y.A. McKenna et al., Demarginalizing the Sexual Self, 38 J. SEX RES.
302, 302 (2001) (“Using anonymous screen names, individuals can explore and express their
sexual interests with little fear that friends, coworkers, or even spouses will discover their
activities.”). See generally JAMIE BARTLETT, THE DARK NET: INSIDE THE DIGITAL UNDERWORLD
(2015) (detailing activities that remain unknown to many Internet users).
18. See United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015).
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s First
Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between ideas and
conduct.”).
21. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA (1955).
22. E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY (2011).
23. Game of Thrones (HBO 2011-present).
24. Grand Theft Auto (BMG Interactive 1997).
25. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 247-48 (“Both themes—teenage sexual activity and the
sexual abuse of children—have inspired countless literary works.... Our society, like other
cultures, has empathy and enduring fascination with the lives and destinies of the young. Art
and literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once
knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices
so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films
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reflecting on sexuality—whether taboo or otherwise—allows
individuals to understand their own desires and pursue a range of
socially desirable ends; they might “come out,” seek treatment,
channel the fantasy into a consensual offline form, openly question
the wisdom of the underlying taboo, or use the fictional account to
cathartically let off steam and aggression.26 In the Internet context,
however, reading and writing about sexual fantasies are often
conflated with acting out the fantasy in the precise manner in which
it is discussed.27 This has resulted in a surprisingly large body of
case law in which individuals face decades in prison and lifetime sex
offender registration without ever demonstrably endangering
themselves or another person.28
As our social interactions become increasingly digitized and re-
corded, the law will be forced to grapple with an increasingly robust
archive of sexual desire. For example, in August 2015, a group of
hackers leaked account information of roughly 37 million subscrib-
ers of the extramarital hookup website AshleyMadison.com.29 The
leaked data revealed descriptions of many account holders’ sexual
fantasies—such as blindfolding, erotic tickling, sex toys, transves-
tism, and a “bubble bath for two.”30 During the same week, the
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for
the Eastern District of New York seized the servers of Rentboy.com,
a website providing advertising and messaging services to gay male
escorts.31 As a result of these two events, leaked Ashley Madison
data have made their way into divorce proceedings,32 and federal
he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men’s minds.”).
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See Martin Robinson & Steph Cockroft, Stamina, Blindfolds, and Spanking: The Most
Popular Sexual Fantasies that Would-Be Cheats Were Looking for on Ashley Madison Infi-
delity Website Are Revealed, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-3204549/Stamina-blindfolds-spanking-popular-sexual-fantasies-cheats-looking-Ashley-
Madison-infidelity-website-revealed.html [https://perma.cc/Q9JL-UZSS].
30. Id.
31. See Homeland Security Raid of Rentboy.com Raises Ire, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 2015, 2:11
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/homeland-security-raid-rentboy-com-raises-ire/ [https://
perma.cc/R9V3-F6CU].
32. See Martin Robinson, Wife Starts First Ashley Madison Divorce Proceedings After
Her Cheating Husband Was Outed as a Member of the Infidelity Website, DAILY MAIL (Aug.
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agencies now possess conversations regarding thousands of men’s
interests and desires towards other men.33 
It is therefore becoming increasingly pressing for scholars, courts,
law enforcement, and policymakers to come to terms both with the
tremendously diverse ways that people explore their sexual fan-
tasies online and with limits of using online fantasy as a meaningful
proxy for sexual misdeeds.34 Previous scholars have examined the
law’s general hostility to taboo sexual desires35 or challenged its
increasingly harsh treatment of online sex offenders.36 This is the
first article, however, to show that intersecting fears of sex and
technology have begun to spread broadly across numerous legal
contexts and seep into the minutiae of evidence and procedure.
Moving forward, as huge droves of data become potential fodder for
both criminal prosecutions and legal disputes regarding employ-
ment, education, divorce, and custody, it will be crucial to find ways
of contextualizing and understanding the inferential limits of sexual
fantasy. As this Article shows, however, the past two decades
present a troubling track record. 
21, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3205657/Wife-starts-Ashley-
Madison-divorce-proceedings-husband-outed-member-infidelity-website.html [https://perma.
cc/7CK3-KBGM].
33. See Dale Cooper, Rentboy: For What It’s Worth, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2015, 5:04
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dale-cooper/rentboy-for-what-its-wort_b_8046340.html
[https://perma.cc/FZD6-NXZ2] (“The government has access, in the seized servers, to all of
their personal information, not to mention that of their clients.”).
34. For example, the Ashley Madison data may seem to disclose an epidemic of kinky
extramarital sex enabled by an online platform, but it turns out that of the 5.5 million
accounts seemingly held by women, “there’s a good chance that about 12,000 of the profiles
out of millions belonged to actual, real women who were active users of Ashley Madison.”
Annalee Newitz, Almost None of the Women in the Ashley Madison Database Ever Used the
Site [Updated], GIZMODO (Aug. 26, 2015, 8:05 PM), http://gizmodo.com/almost-none-of-the-
women-in-the-ashley-madison-database-1725558944 [https://perma.cc/PZ6A-4Y74]. As one
commentator observed, the vast majority of men were not having affairs; “[t]hey were paying
for a fantasy.” Id.
35. See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM 348-50 (2006); UMMNI KHAN, VICARIOUS KINKS: S/M IN THE SOCIO-LEGAL IMAGI-
NARY 13-15 (2014); Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 102, 115-16 (2014).
36. See, e.g., Carrisa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex
Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 860-63 (2011); Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-Predators
as Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in
Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 558 (2002); McLeod,
supra note 12, at 1572-73.
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Part I will briefly locate Internet fantasy within contemporary
understandings of sexual identity. Part II compiles, for the first
time, a diverse body of case law that has punished, burdened, or
otherwise harshly treated sexual fantasy. This includes divorce and
custody decisions, “sexting” prosecutions, attempt and conspiracy
crimes premised on sexual fantasies, admission of sexual fantasies
as character propensity evidence, failed entrapment defenses, and
failed free speech defenses. Part III will critique this legal treatment
of sexual fantasy from two perspectives. First, it will show that
these decisions are at odds with the First Amendment framework
for distinguishing fantasy from harmful conduct. Second, it will
survey a growing body of social science research to show that there
is a range of valuable reasons to allow people greater space to ex-
plore their fantasies online, regardless of how objectionable they
may appear to many observers. The Conclusion will suggest ways
to better respect the inevitably blurry line between fantasy and
harmful conduct and avoid some of the chilling effects of punishing
sexual fantasy.
I. SEXUAL IDENTITY: SITUATED, EVOLVING, AND PERFORMATIVE
Many forms of identity—for example, gender, race, and sexual
orientation—are often framed and experienced as fixed and im-
mutable at birth. From this perspective, identity development is a
process of observing and uncovering the unfolding secrets of the
psyche; as we move from childhood to adolescence to adulthood, our
identities reveal themselves, and our challenge is to understand,
manage, and come to terms with our essential human nature.37
Adolescence, accordingly, becomes an inherently tumultuous and
dangerous phase: life inexperience renders teenagers ill-equipped
to control their hormonal drives and make good decisions without
the oversights and constraints of parents, schools, and the state.38
37. See JUDITH HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME AND PLACE: TRANSGENDER BODIES,
SUBCULTURAL LIVES 153 (2005) (observing the “conventional binary formulation of a life
narrative,” which “charts an obvious transition out of childish dependency through marriage
and into adult responsibility through reproduction”); Andrew Gilden, Cyberbullying and the
Innocence Narrative, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 404-05 (2013) (summarizing this
conventional view of immutable identity and normal sexual identity development).
38. See AMY ADELE HASINOFF, SEXTING PANIC: RETHINKING CRIMINALIZATION, PRIVACY,
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Under this view, so long as they are safely transported from puberty
to the age of eighteen, the kids will be all right.
Contemporary identity scholars have largely rejected this “es-
sentialist” view of identity, and particularly of sexual identity.39
Identity is not fixed at birth; it does not spring into being like Venus
from the sea. Instead, identity is produced through ongoing in-
teractions with other people, institutions, and popular culture.40
Through these interactions, we come to learn the identities and life
narratives at our disposal and internalize the norms and values
associated with these various paths.41 Through our interaction with
other people, we acquire both the building blocks for constructing a
coherent set of identities and the toolkits for managing and pre-
senting these identities in our everyday lives.42 Doctors, parents,
and religious institutions may assign us a range of presumptive
identities and life courses, but these assignments too are part of the
cultural processes by which minds and bodies are inscribed with
social norms and values.43 We work with and against these norms,
values, and identities both in adolescence and throughout our lives,
and this process often can be messy and highly improvisational.
Numerous scholars, accordingly, have recognized that explora-
tion, or “play,” is a central mechanism for all people to construct
AND CONSENT 60-64 (2015); ROGER N. LANCASTER, SEX PANIC AND THE PUNITIVE STATE 42-45
(2011); KATHRYN BOND STOCKTON, THE QUEER CHILD, OR GROWING SIDEWAYS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 4-5 (2009); Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent,
22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 293 (2010).
39. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of
the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994).
40. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
84-86 (1990); 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 116-17 (Robert Hurley trans.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1978).
41. See generally THE STORY OF SEXUAL IDENTITY: NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE GAY
AND LESBIAN LIFE COURSE (Phillip L. Hammack & Bertram J. Cohler eds., 2009); Phillip L.
Hammack & Bertram J. Cohler, Narrative, Identity, and the Politics of Exclusion: Social
Change and the Gay and Lesbian Life Course, 8 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 162, 178-79
(2011).
42. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1-2 (1959); David
J. Phillips, From Privacy to Visibility: Context, Identity, and Power in Ubiquitous Computing
Environments, 23 SOC. TEXT 83, 98 (2005).
43. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 105-06
(1993); Dean Spade, Commentary, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 25 (2003).
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their identities and situate themselves within their culture.44
Through play—whether in a sandbox, board game, chat room, or
bedroom—we simultaneously pursue pleasure, engage in creative
problem solving, understand how to relate to other people’s skills
and experience, and move towards solidifying identity and social
bonds.45 Nonetheless, legal and social institutions often fail to
appreciate these links between identity development and play,
fantasy, and exploration.46 For young people, play is fraught with
risks and the potential to be injured physically, emotionally, or
morally either by one’s own ignorance or by the stranger lurking at
the edge of playground.47 Adolescence is widely understood to be a
time of central importance regarding identity, but collective fears
surrounding the vulnerability of minors results in substantial lim-
its on their abilities to play and explore—for example, curfews,
overscheduling, Internet monitoring, GPS tracking, and pervasive
warnings to steer clear of unfamiliar adults.48 By contrast, adults
generally are allowed unfettered access to all manner of exploration
and play—from social media to PlayStation to bars to gambling to
pornography. Yet rarely do we connect adult “play” to identity
development—by adulthood, identity is (or should be) resolved, and
controversial activities made in play spaces can be dismissed as
irrational or morally questionable.49 For adults, play is often
associated with procrastination, laziness, or something to do during
44. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 133-35 (2012).
45. Id. at 225-29; Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1221, 1267-68 (2011).
46. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 53-54.
47. See, e.g., Joan Almon, The Fear of Play, EXCHANGE, Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 42 (“People
freely admit they are afraid of accidents in play and want to minimize risk.... There is also a
widespread fear of ‘stranger danger.’ ... The current mindset in the U.S. leads [Americans] to
create a life that is as safe and risk-free as possible.”).
48. See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 87
(2014); STOCKTON, supra note 38, at 40-41 ; Bernstein & Triger, supra note 45, at 1238-39,
1240 n.94; Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Parentalism, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1215, 1216-17
(2009). This Article uses danah boyd’s preferred characterization of her name. See danah
michele boyd, What’s in a Name?, DANAH.ORG, http://www.danah.org/name/html [https://
perma.cc/UP43-MQVH].
49. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 129-31; HALBERSTAM, supra note 37, at 152-53;
HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 68-69.
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time off—fun, but nonetheless frivolous pursuits like poker, Candy
Crush, or Tinder. 
The emergence of digital networks does not fundamentally change
these processes of identity development or the collective discomfort
with explorations of identity and desire. The Internet can provide
new arenas in which to play and explore, to construct identity, and
to situate ourselves within our cultural landscape.50 The processes
of identity development in the digital era remain messy and
improvisational, but with the added twist that these processes have
become far more transparent and easily policed.51 When teenagers
actively use the Internet to explore and understand sexual desire,
adults, and the legal system in particular, have often reacted with
panic—for example, by vigorously pursuing and punishing potential
sexual predators that are both adults and children.52 On the flip
side, when adults use the Internet to explore their sexual fantasies,
they are often dismissed as predators and harassers when they may
have identity-based interests similar to those of adolescents.53 The
following sections will show this dynamic in action: the law punish-
es explorations of sexual fantasy by both teenagers and adults based
on a supposedly commonsense understanding that teenagers are
inevitably harmed by Internet-mediated sexuality and that adults
who explore their sexual fantasies online should at the very least be
viewed with suspicion.
In previous work, I showed that the law has frequently dis-
counted the value of the Internet to LGBT teens for exploring their
sexuality with relative autonomy and anonymity.54 I argued that in
order to understand and come to terms with their sexuality, LGBT
teens needed to learn about, talk about, and to some degree ex-
periment with their sexual desires, and that the Internet provided
unprecedented opportunities to do all of these things in relative
50. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 44, at 34-35; Gary W. Harper et al., The Role of the
Internet in the Sexual Identity Development of Gay and Bisexual Male Adolescents, in THE
STORY OF SEXUAL IDENTITY, supra note 41, at 297, 302.
51. See, e.g., NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 185 (2015).
52. See, e.g., HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 35-36; LANCASTER, supra note 38, at 63-64;
McLeod, supra note 12, at 1572-73.
53. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 36, at 546-47 (discussing congressional debates sur-
rounding the Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act).
54. See Gilden, supra note 37, at 377-83.
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physical and emotional safety.55 I emphasize here that such interest
in sexual identity is limited neither to LGBT people nor to adoles-
cents. Sexual identity and desires do not simply boil down to sexual
orientation, but encompass a tremendous range of physical acts,
power dynamics, gender roles, and emotional attachments that both
splinter and transcend the gay/straight matrix. Moreover, sexual
identity is neither fixed at birth, cemented at the age of consent, nor
a one-way trip out of whatever closet you have come out of. This is
not to say that sexual identity is not deeply important or that it is
akin to a hat that you can put on and take off at will. Nonetheless,
sexual desires, communities, and identities can change and evolve
throughout one’s life, and the Internet provides opportunities for a
broad range of people to explore their fantasies56 and embrace the
dynamic, ongoing process of self-definition.57
One of the primary threats posed by digital networks is that they
effectively loosen the family and community’s hold on the norms and
values that shape identity development. Through the Internet and
social media, adolescents—and everyone else for that matter—can
envision themselves situated in broader circles of acculturation than
would have been accessible in earlier generations, and access to
these distant social circles allows individuals to explore and inter-
nalize a range of perspectives potentially at odds with norms in a
local community.58 Particularly in the realm of sexuality, where it
can be deeply uncomfortable or potentially dangerous to discuss
taboo desires, the Internet provides at least semi-anonymous forums
to test out and engage with a seemingly endless array of fantasies
and pleasures.59 This is certainly not to say that the Internet is a
social utopia; indeed, there are considerable, well-documented risks
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Kristian Daneback & Michael W. Ross, The Complexity of Internet Sexuality,
in SEXUAL DYSFUNCTION: BEYOND THE BRAIN-BODY CONNECTION 121, 121 (Richard Balon ed.,
2011); Darryl B. Hill, Coming to Terms: Using Technology to Know Identity, SEXUALITY &
CULTURE, Summer 2005, at 24, 49-50 (2005); McKenna et al., supra note 17, at 302.
57. This dynamic is by no means limited to sexual identity—the Internet can be deeply
helpful for exploring gender identity, racial identity, religious identity, ancestry, language,
and pretty much any other axis of self-definition. 
58. See Gilden, supra note 37, at 393.
59. See infra Part III.B; see also Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men,
Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (2003) (describing how gay and
lesbian individuals can explore their sexuality online with relative anonymity).
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that online communities can normalize self-destructive behaviors or
perpetuate sexism, racism, and other forms of prejudice.60 It is to
say, however, that our online lives are an extension and reflection
of our offline lives: complex, evolving, and full of potential risks and
rewards.61 
Whether and how online explorations of sexuality manifest offline
is impossible to predict with certainty, but, at the very least, a
dialectic exists between virtual and real that continually produces
and refines identity and desire.62 Part III will more thoroughly
examine the potential psychological and cultural value of online
explorations of sexual fantasy. At this juncture, the important
takeaway is that online sexual play and fantasy are neither merely
frivolous time killers nor inevitable one-way gateways into adoles-
cent ruin. As digital technologies become an increasingly integral
part of our day-to-day lives, it becomes increasingly important to
treat them with the mundane importance they deserve.63
II. CYBERLAW AND SEXUAL FANTASY
Even though the Internet and social media have become integral
parts of identity development and contemporary social interactions,
legal actors frequently react hostilely when confronted with indi-
viduals who have used Internet resources to explore their sexuality.
This Part will canvass a broad range of legal issues from multiple
jurisdictions in three sections: (1) family law, (2) teenage “sexting”
prosecutions, and (3) law enforcement oversight of chat rooms, social
media, and other iterations of the sexual Internet.
The scenarios canvassed herein are far from identical in terms of
the actors being punished (spouses versus teenagers versus adult
men) or in the amount of offline conduct involved. Nonetheless,
60. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 15, at 226-27.
61. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 124 (collecting research showing that vulnerabilities
online reflect similar risk factors—for example, familial conflict, depression, and substance
abuse—to vulnerabilities offline).
62. See, e.g., MARY L. GRAY, OUT IN THE COUNTRY: YOUTH, MEDIA, AND QUEER VISIBILITY
IN RURAL AMERICA 15 (2009) (describing how rural LGBT youth “suture the queer social
worlds they find in their hometowns, on television, and online”).
63. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 44, at 129-30; GRAY, supra note 62, at 117-18 (urging
scholars and policymakers to move beyond the negative effects of media consumption and
engage with the role of new media in the everyday lives of LGBT youth).
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there are important, troubling similarities in how the law responds
to these diverse forms of sexual desire. In each area, networked
technologies surface sexual fantasies and desires that are uncom-
fortable or unfamiliar for many people, and they do so often in vivid,
sordid detail. As judges, juries, and law enforcement grapple with
these vivid details of sexual desire, they are repeatedly unable to
divorce their disapproval of the sexual desire at hand from an
evenhanded assessment of the actual risks posed by the parties.
Whether the case involves a divorcing parent’s search for new
sexual connections, a teenager’s sexual explorations, or a criminal
defendant’s conversations about taboo fetishes, legal actors repeat-
edly conflate sexual desire with actual harm to third parties, and
they rarely appreciate the potential dangers of doing so. Sometimes
the law directly punishes sexual fantasy itself, akin to Minority
Report64-style “thought crimes,” and at other times it treats taboo
fantasies as inevitable stepping-stones toward harmful conduct. In
either iteration, legal actors troublingly use sexual fantasy as a
crystal ball into the criminal or otherwise immoral workings of the
human psyche.
A. Family Law
Family law decision-making often flies in the face of the First
Amendment, subjecting parents and guardians to a wide spectrum
of restraints on speech under the banner of “the best interests of the
child.”65 As Professor Eugene Volokh has demonstrated, parents
have had their rights limited or denied based on their adherence to
or defense of a wide range of disfavored ideologies, including com-
munism, pacifism, nonmonogamy, polygamy, homosexuality, and
“non-mainstream religions.”66 Professor Volokh’s research has fur-
ther shown that family court judges have based custody decisions on
parental speech that is otherwise squarely protected by the First
Amendment, including swearing, unfiltered Internet use, watching
R-rated movies, reading gun-themed magazines, looking at photos
64. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).
65. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 637 (2006).
66. Id. at 635-37.
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of drag queens, listening to vulgar music, and viewing pornog-
raphy.67 Consistent with this speech-restrictive trend, courts have
also looked negatively upon parents that have used the Internet to
explore their sexual fantasies in entirely lawful ways.
Under the best interests standard, courts have used a parent’s
exploration of sexual fantasies as a proxy for his or her poor moral
fitness and mental health. For example, in Borden v. Borden, a
woman in Mississippi was denied primary custody of her two chil-
dren when “the chancellor found that her extramarital contact with
the two men negatively affected her responsibility as a parent.”68
During the custody trial, her ex-husband introduced a seventy-five-
page transcript of Facebook chats between her and an ex-boyfriend,
“which contained numerous sexual references.”69 Even though the
couple was experiencing marital difficulties at the time of the
“inappropriate Facebook chats,” and the children were not home
during these chats, the court of appeals affirmed the chancellor’s
custody award.70 Although the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed
on two of the eight best interests of the child factors—“parenting
skills” and “stable home environment”—it held that the chancellor
“correctly found” that the wife’s extramarital communications re-
flected poorly on her “moral fitness.”71 
In In re Marriage of Grose, an Illinois appellate court affirmed a
trial court’s finding that a father’s “mental health” weighed against
awarding him custody.72 Central to this finding was evidence that
the father viewed Internet pornography and posted ads looking
for women interested in, among other things, “bondage & spank-
ing.”73 After summarizing the bondage, domination, sadism, and
67. Id. at 638-39.
68. 130 So. 3d 1168, 1172 (Miss. Ct. App.), rev’d, 167 So. 3d 238 (Miss. 2014).
69. Id. at 1171.
70. Id.
71. Borden, 167 So. 3d at 242-43. Even when judges have granted custody notwith-
standing some evidence of sexual Internet behavior, they have made a point of distancing
themselves from the behavior. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 632 N.W.2d 48, 55 (S.D. 2001) (“The
court believed Renee’s testimony that she had abstained from Internet usage and erotic
discourse since the temporary custody hearing. Although the court labeled such conduct
‘potentially harmful’ and ‘appalling,’ it found no ‘demonstrable effect on [Jorgito].’”); see also
Borden, 130 So. 3d at 1176 (James, J., dissenting in part) (“Mary Jane’s behavior was indis-
putably a poor reflection on her moral fitness, but not on her parenting skills.”).
72. No. 4-12-005, 2012 WL 7050410, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. May 24, 2012).
73. Id. at *2.
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masochism (BDSM) interests included in the father’s profile, as well
as the role-playing scenes he fantasized about, the court concluded
that the evidence could support an adverse finding on his mental
health.74 There was no evidence, however, that the child had ever
been exposed to any sexual materials or that the father’s fantasies
involved minors.75
In Bower v. Bower, the chancellor also ruled that the mental
health factor weighed against a mother’s custody.76 The mother ar-
gued that “in today’s society, meeting people over the Internet is
viewed as an option to meeting people at church, work, or through
a dating service, and, although it is a new innovative tool in today’s
society, its use is not an indication of unstable behavior.”77 The
chancellor disagreed, emphasizing that “she ha[d] spent enormous
amounts of time on the Internet talking to strange men.”78
Despite other evidence that a parent has a strong bond with his
or her child and otherwise has not put the child in any immediate
danger of harm, the potential unknown risks of online sexuality
have made courts uneasy. For example, In re Marriage of Chisholm
presented the Court of Appeals of Iowa with a situation in which
both parents had explored their sexual fantasies online.79 Although
disclaiming moral judgment on “this type of ‘entertainment,’” the
parents’ online behaviors nonetheless were “troubling to the
court.”80 The court observed:
The use of the internet opens new horizons to people around the
world, including those in small-town Iowa. It can be a tremen-
dous resource of both information and linking people together,
yet it is fraught with unknown risks to unsuspecting users....
Both Jason and Tasha were attracted to adult chat rooms and
pornography. While Tasha engaged in sexually explicit online
conversation, Jason exchanged photos with a woman he met in
a chat room and briefly subscribed to a pornographic site.81
74. Id. at *6.
75. See id. at *3.
76. 758 So. 2d 405, 411-12 (Miss. 2000).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. No. 00-77, 2000 WL 1027237, at *1, *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2000).
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id.
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Because Tasha had actually invited two men into the family home,
however, Jason was awarded primary custody.82 Even though
neither of the children was at home at the time, “[t]hese invitations
put the children at great risk of harm, as strangers were given the
family’s address and brought into the home.”83 Although this might
seem to cross an important line, this behavior trumped evidence
that Tasha otherwise “was undisputedly the parent that was intri-
cately involved in every aspect of the children’s care.... Tasha’s role
as primary caregiver does not guarantee her physical care in a
contested matter.”84
Courts will sometimes take fairly extreme measures to ensure
that a parent’s sexual behavior online has no negative spillover. For
example, in Micnhimer v. Micnhimer, the mother had been given
primary custody.85 The father was allowed unsupervised visitation
on the conditions that (1) he not have any access to the Internet in
his home, and (2) his wife could inspect any computer in his home
to ensure he had no Internet access.86 These conditions were put in
place because the father had at some point viewed pornography
while the children were in the same house with him.87 Although the
Arizona court’s opinion did not detail the nature of this pornogra-
phy, it did mention that the father objected to the “homophobic bias”
of the initial order, and that he now had a “partner/roommate.”88
Five years later, the father managed to alter the visitation condi-
tions: he could now access the Internet, so long as the computer was
in a locked room, secured with a protected password.89 
Beyond the relatively limited body of published custody opinions,
family law practitioners have relayed a broader practice of fam-
ily court judges removing children or restricting custody when a
parent had demonstrated an interest in BDSM activities, such as
through blog postings or participation in an e-mail listserv.90 One
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *4.
85. No. 1 CA-CV 08-0508, 2009 WL 3526575, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. at *1.
90. Susan Wright, Depathologizing Consensual Sexual Sadism, Sexual Masochism,
Transvestic Fetishism, and Fetishism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1229, 1229 (2010).
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organization, the National Coalition for Sexual Freedom, frequently
steps into custody disputes to protect the legal interests of BDSM-
practitioners, and it often needs to educate judges that a demon-
strated interest in bondage or sadomasochism does not equate to
mental illness or poor parenting.91 For example, in one case, a
woman’s ex-husband found her profile on the website FetLife and
used her posts, pictures, and writings about consensual BDSM ac-
tivities to claim that she was a danger to their children.92 Similarly,
in another case, a man’s ex-wife found his girlfriend’s FetLife profile
and sought to deny him access to their children, even though the
images the ex-wife discovered were solely of equipment, clothing,
and attendance at BDSM community events.93
Judges’ skepticism and hostility toward evidence of online sexual
fantasy raise several issues. First, none of the above cases included
any evidence of actual harm toward or neglect of the children who
are supposed to be the real focus of the best interests of the child
standard; instead, it is the perceived morality or wisdom of the
parent that determines whether he or she deserves custody over an
ex-spouse.
Second, in all of the above cases, the negative consequences of
exploring online sexuality fall on women, gay men, and people with
nonnormative sexual interests, such as BDSM. By contrast, in a
number of published decisions, courts have separated out a hus-
band’s heterosexual pornography and sexually explicit conversations
with women from the child’s best interests and dismissed the
potential spillover harms as speculative.94
91. See id. (describing the National Coalition for Sexual Freedom).
92. Interview with Susan Wright, Media Relations Dir., Nat’l Coal. for Sexual Freedom
(May 28, 2015) (on file with author).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Givens v. Givens, 53 So. 3d 720, 729 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he majority of
the evidence at trial pertained to Kenneth Givens’ activity on pornographic internet websites,
the sexually explicit communications, through the internet, between him and Barbara Givens,
and their subsequent use of the internet to exchange lewd photographs of parts of their
bodies. All of this activity occurred when Kenneth Givens was still living in the family home
with Frances Givens and Olivia, and both Frances Givens and Olivia were unaware of
Kenneth Givens’ activity in this regard.”); Delly v. Delly, No. 2011-L-018, 2011 WL 5829699,
at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2011) (“While the evidence indicates that Daniel has viewed
pornography and seen a therapist regarding this issue in the past, the evidence presented at
the trial established that Daniel’s use of the internet did not negatively impact A.D.”); Petty
v. Petty, No. E2004-01421-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1183149, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19,
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Third, judicial hostility toward marginalized sexuality may
discourage individuals from openly discussing their sexual desires
with their spouse, when it may be in the best interests of everyone
involved for a couple to be open and honest about evolving desires.
If one spouse has brewing sexual curiosities that may be at odds
with the other spouse’s desires, it seems important to surface,
rather than deter and suppress, any significant incompatibilities.
Instead, if individuals introduce their spouses to their online fan-
tasy world, fail to sufficiently scrub their browser history,  happen
to be the target of adultery surveillance software,95 or are included
in a data leak—and a spouse reacts negatively—their very private,
and potentially embarrassing, fantasy world can be used to deny
those individuals access to their children.96 
Fourth, these consequences attach at a particularly vulnerable
moment in the parties’ lives—the dissolution of a relationship—
when the Internet may be most useful as an outlet and a resource.
Sexual fantasies of course give no license to cause physical or
emotional harm to one’s spouse or child or to impose those sexual
fantasies upon others. Yet, this line between fantasy and coercion
has repeatedly collapsed in the custody context.
B. Sexting and Child Pornography
The previous section showed that a parent’s sexual fantasies have
been used as a proxy for harm to a child’s best interests. This
section shows that minors’ sexual fantasies sometimes are used as
a proxy for harm to their own best interests. In a disturbing number
2005) (“While clearly Father’s time could have been better spent in activities other than those
described, no proof has been presented in this case that any of the activities ascribed to
Father has affected his relationship with his children or that his children have been, or will
be, exposed to any material which has been designated ‘pornographic.’”); B.M.M. v. P.R.M.,
No. M2002-02242-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1853418, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2004)
(“Viewed as a whole, the evidence simply does not support Mother’s conclusion that Father’s
viewing of pornography as their marriage disintegrated and the isolated incidents that
occurred when he was a teenager mean that Father has engaged in sexually inappropriate
behavior with their daughter or that he is likely to engage in such behavior.”).
95. See Melissa Gregg, Adultery Technologies, in IDENTITY TECHNOLOGIES: CONSTRUCTING
THE SELF ONLINE 99, 99-100 (Anna Poletti & Julie Rak eds., 2014).
96. The marital confidences privilege typically does not apply in child custody disputes.
See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:40 (4th ed.
2015); see also, e.g., T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 693 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Mo. 1985).
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of cases, teenagers have been threatened or charged with child
pornography violations after an authority figure discovered that
they had produced and consensually shared sexually charged
imagery.97 The ubiquity of “sexting” among teenagers and the re-
sulting “sexting panic” have received extensive attention in the
popular and academic press,98 and this Article’s treatment is not
designed to be exhaustive. The sexting phenomenon nonetheless is
an important part of the cultural conversation around sexuality
mediated by the Internet and digital communications. The anxieties
around sexting again reveal a tendency to collapse fantasy and
coercion in the digital context and to downplay the importance of
sexual agency and autonomy, regardless of how uncomfortable it
often makes us.
A few examples illustrate the legal treatment of sexting. In Miller
v. Skumanick, middle school teachers in Wyoming County, Pennsyl-
vania, discovered sexually provocative images on a few students’
phones, and school district officials confiscated all of the middle-
schoolers’ phones.99 After finding sexted images on seventeen
student phones, the school district relinquished those phones to the
District Attorney, who in turn threatened to charge those seventeen
students with production, possession, or dissemination of child
pornography unless they completed a six- to nine-month reeducation
program.100 Parents of three teenagers successfully sued the District
Attorney for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.101 The
District Court and the Third Circuit both held that compelling the
teenagers to participate in the reeducation program would violate
their parents’ rights both to control their children’s upbringing and
to free speech.102
97. See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., HASINOFF, supra note 38; Marsha Levick & Kristina Moon, Prosecuting
Sexting as Child Pornography: A Critique, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1035, 1035-36 (2010); Hanna
Rosin, Why Kids Sext: An Inquiry into One Recent Scandal Reveals How Kids Think About
Sexting—And What Parents and Police Should Do About It, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/why-kids-sext/380798/ [https://perma.
cc/XGH2-8RW5].
99. 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 645 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff ’d sub nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d
139 (3d Cir. 2010).
100. Id. at 638.
101. Id. at 647.
102. See id.
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Although the Miller plaintiffs were faced only with the threat of
criminal charges, other sexters have faced far more serious conse-
quences. In Alabama, authorities arrested four middle-school
students for exchanging nude photos of themselves.103 An eighteen-
year-old Iowa boy was forced to register as a sex offender after
sending a naked photo of himself to a fifteen-year-old girl.104 Three
high-school girls from Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, were
charged with producing and disseminating child pornography after
sending nude or seminude photos of themselves to three male
classmates, ages sixteen and seventeen.105 The boys were also
charged with possession of child pornography for having the images
on their phones.106
In United States v. Nash, a sixteen-year-old girl consensually sent
sexually explicit images of herself to her twenty-two-year-old
boyfriend.107 Even though their sexual relationship was entirely
lawful in Alabama (where the age of consent is sixteen), Nash was
charged with possession of child pornography.108 Although the court
departed from the Sentencing Guidelines’s recommended twenty-
four-to-thirty month range, Nash nonetheless was given five years
of probation and subjected to lifetime sex offender registration.109
In another case, two young women, sixteen- and nineteen-years
old, exchanged sexually explicit photos, and the nineteen-year-old
was charged with producing child pornography after the younger
woman’s mother turned over her cellphone to local police.110
Although the nineteen-year-old was able to avoid the child pornog-
raphy charges and sex offender registration by pleading guilty to
103. Gigi Stone, ‘Sexting’ Teens Can Go Too Far, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2009), http://abc
news.go.com/Technology/WorldNews/sexting-teens/story?id=6456834 [https://perma.cc/ 3FT5-
4WNN].
104. Vicki Mabrey & David Perozzi, ‘Sexting’: Should Child Pornography Laws Apply?,
ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/phillip-alpert-sexting-teen-child-
porn/story?id=10252790 [https://perma.cc/N83A-QFMZ].
105. See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside the
Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (2009).
106. Id.
107. 1 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1241 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
108. Id. at 1241-42, 1244.
109. Id. at 1248.
110. See HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 8.
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“luring a minor,” she nonetheless spent over a month in jail and lost
her job at a call center due to her felony conviction.111
In A.H. v. State, a sixteen-year-old and her seventeen-year-old
boyfriend were adjudicated delinquent on child pornography charges
for taking photos of themselves in consensual sexual behavior.112
Neither shared the images with third parties, and the photos were
found on a computer in the girlfriend’s home.113 The girlfriend
argued that application of Florida’s child pornography laws in this
context violated her reasonable expectation of privacy, and the court
rejected this argument.114 According to the court:
Minors who are involved in a sexual relationship, unlike adults
who may be involved in a mature committed relationship, have
no reasonable expectation that their relationship will continue
and that the photographs will not be shared with others
intentionally or unintentionally....
...A reasonably prudent person would believe that if you put
this type of material in a teenager’s hands that, at some point
either for profit or bragging rights, the material will be dissem-
inated to other members of the public.115
Furthermore, “[t]he fact that these photographs may have or may
not have been shown in no way affects the minor’s reasonable
expectation that there was a distinct and real possibility that the
other teenager involved would at some point make these photos
public.”116 According to the court, “Appellant was simply too young
to make an intelligent decision about engaging in sexual conduct
and memorializing it. Mere production of these videos or pictures
may also result in psychological trauma to the teenagers in-
volved.”117
111. See id.
112. 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 235, 239.
115. Id. at 237.
116. Id. at 238.
117. Id. at 238-39; see also Robby Soave, Teen Boy Will Be Charged as Adult for Having
Naked Pics of a Minor: Himself, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Sept. 2, 2015, 4:31 PM), http://
reason.com/blog/2015/09/02/teen-boy-will-be-charged-as-adult-for-ha [https://perma.cc/L9QH-
XHSE].
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Several features of the sexting cases are consistent with the
treatment of adult sexual fantasies documented above. First, there
was noticeable speculation about the potential harms from consen-
sual sexting and an equation of teenagers’ sexual expression with
their sexual abuse. There certainly have been well-documented
incidents in which sexually explicit photos, often of young women,
have been disseminated broadly without their consent and used as
a basis for bullying and harassment.118 The recent attention to the
very real, and entirely unjustifiable, practice of “revenge porn”
highlights the potential negative consequences of producing or
disseminating sexual imagery: loss of employment, sexual harass-
ment, increased risks of stalking and domestic violence, and serious
anxiety disorders.119 But, as revenge porn opponents have empha-
sized, consent is a key component in regulating the production and
dissemination of sexual imagery.120 The harms from sexting largely
emerge from some act of coercion, breach of trust, or distribution of
an image beyond its intended audience; by contrast, images that are
shared consensually and produced without coercion121 do not cross
that important line.122 Nonetheless, the sexting cases largely ignore
that line and presume harm merely because a sexual image has
been produced. Even while it is entirely legal for the parties to
actually have sex with each other, they can be branded as lifelong
sex offenders if they instead remain in their separate bedrooms and
set up cameras.
118. See, e.g., Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over ‘Sexting,’ TODAY (Mar. 6,
2009, 9:26 AM), http://www.today.com/parents/her-teen-committed-suicide-over-sexting-2D
80555048 [https://perma.cc/TS5F-UFTG] (discussing Jessica Logan’s suicide after her ex-
boyfriend sent naked pictures of her to other teenage girls, who repeatedly harassed and
bullied her).
119. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 350-54 (2014).
120. See id. at 348; Amy Adele Hasinoff, How to Have Great Sext: Consent Advice in Online
Sexting Tips, 13 COMM. & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 58, 58-59 (2015).
121. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002).
122. See HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 110 (“[E]rasing girls’ agency can have the problematic
effect of conflating consensual and harmful uses of sexual images.”); id. at 129 (arguing that
“explicit consent should be required for the circulation of private media and information”);
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1706
(2015) (“Criminal charges brought against adolescents for sexting each other, however, are
often unjustified because their behaviors fall short of risking actual abuse of children.”). 
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Second, little value is placed on the teenagers’ interests in
understanding and exploring their fantasies and desires. As
children’s rights advocates Marsha Levick and Kristina Moon have
observed, “‘[A] vital part of adolescence is thinking and experiment-
ing with areas of sexuality’.... Sexting is the result of a convergence
between the well-recognized adolescent need for sexual exploration
and new technology that allows teens to explore their sexual
relationships via private photographs shared in real-time.”123
Nonetheless, as demonstrated by the court’s reasoning in A.H. v.
State,124 sexting prosecutions reflect a deep skepticism about the
possibility that teenagers might have an interest in sexual auton-
omy or that they might be able to make informed decisions about
the use of their likenesses. Even when courts have stepped in to halt
aggressive efforts to police teen sexting, they have not done so out
of respect for teenagers’ sexual autonomy, privacy, or authority over
their image or likeness.125 Instead, the Miller court stayed the
District Attorney’s hand out of respect for parental authority over
teenagers’ upbringing and sexual morality.126 The ACLU framed the
case in a way that avoided raising the teenagers’ own free speech
and privacy interests surrounding sexual exploration and fantasy.
As Professor Amy Hasinoff has observed, the briefing in the case
repeatedly emphasized the “fun” and nonsexual nature of the photos
at issue—the girls were showing off “training bras,” and horsing
around at a “sleepover,” “[r]emoving sexual agency from sexting.”127 
123. Levick & Moon, supra note 98, at 1038-39 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynn E.
Ponton & Samuel Judice, Typical Adolescent Sexual Development, 13 CHILD ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 497, 508 (2004)).
124. 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
125. Both Derek Bambauer and Amy Hasinoff have advocated an authorship approach to
sexting, which analogizes an individual’s right to control distribution of sexual imagery to a
copyright owner’s right to control distribution of original creative works. See Derek E.
Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2032 (2014); Amy Adele Hasinoff, Sexting as
Media Production: Rethinking Social Media and Sexuality, 15 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 449, 449-
50 (2013). Under this approach, the harm from sexting is not the mere creation of the image,
but instead its unauthorized reproduction, display, and distribution.
126. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
127. HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 28. Hasinoff has also observed that sexting commentaries
have discounted the potential significance of sexting by casting it as a result of raging
hormones, as a playful adolescent phase, or as merely frivolous and misguided. Id. at 67. In
this frame, sexting is an aspect of a fleeting, temporary sexuality that is distinct from the
discovery and development of adult sexual identity. Id.
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Third, as in the family law context, the risk of sexting prose-
cutions falls particularly heavily on marginalized sexualities. In the
above cases, the criminal charges were not the result of an ag-
grieved victim who went to the police; instead, they stemmed from
either a parent or a teacher discovering an image that was not
intended for their viewing. Accordingly, whether a sexter faces le-
gal sanctions lies largely within the discretion of parents and other
authority figures who may or may not approve of the relationship in
question. Several sexting prosecutions have involved gay and les-
bian teens,128 and at least one study has found that respondents
were significantly more likely to recommend sex offender regis-
tration for sexting when the youths were gay or lesbian than if
they were heterosexual.129 Where explorations of sexual fantasy are
framed solely in terms of whether the government or parent has a
stronger right to control a teenager’s sexual development, the opin-
ions and preferences of those entities will predictably sideline the
teenager’s less mainstream—yet often entirely healthy and legiti-
mate—sexual desires.130
C. Criminal Law, Internet Stings, and Social Media Surveillance
The following conversation was read into evidence in a Manhat-
tan courtroom in the of winter of 2013:
Meatmarketman: OK. Are you married? How big is your oven?
Is it fan assisted?
128. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text; Hasinoff, supra note 38, at 38-39
(summarizing a case in which a seventeen-year-old was put on probation for sending a
sexually explicit video of himself to his sixteen-year-old boyfriend; the younger boy’s parents
found the video and called the police).
129. Erin Comartin et al., “Sexting” and Sex Offender Registration: Do Age, Gender, and
Sexual Orientation Matter?, 34 DEVIANT BEHAV. 38, 45 (2013).
130. For a discussion of systemic bias against queer people within the criminal justice
system, see DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS
AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 20 (2011); and JOEY E. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, at xii (Michael Bronski ed., 2012);
see also Orly Rachmilovitz, Family Assimilation Demands and Sexual Minority Youth, 98
MINN. L. REV. 1374, 1412 (2014) (“The insufficient protection that the three cases above offer
children de facto signals to LGBT youth that their sexual identity and relationships are
inferior and illegitimate and are, quite literally, harmful to themselves and their parents.”).
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[Mhal52]: I am single, and it’s a big gas oven but I am also open
to other ideas like an outdoor spit roast. No one around for
three-quarters of a mile.
Meatmarketman: How big? I’ve seldom seen an oven big enough
to take a whole adult, even a small one.
[Mhal52]: It’s hard to say, but it’s big enough, as long as the girl
is trussed up I can fit her in, definitely Kimberly.
Meatmarketman: How big is she?
[Mhal52]: Five foot two.
Meatmarketman: Weight?
[Mhal52]: 110-115 pounds.
Meatmarketman: Very good. Would you want me to decapitate
and gut her first?
[Mhal52]: Well, here’s my ideal situation, you let me know if it
will work. I really want her to suffer, so I am hoping to cook her
alive, but just until she dies. Once she is dead, I will take her out
and properly butcher her body and cook the meat right away.
And that could be out on a rotisserie too.
.... 
Meatmarketman: You need to be very secluded.
[Mhal52]: I am, believe me.... I have a place up in the mountains.
No one around for three-quarters of a mile.
.... 
Meatmarketman: Have you ever eaten anyone before?
[Mhal52]: No, I haven’t.
Meatmarketman: I have. The meat isn’t quite like pork, but very
meaty anyway. Ever considered a black or Asian girl?
[Mhal52]: No, not really. White girls seem the most appetizing
to me. So I’m thinking a Labor Day cookout. First Monday of
September with Kimberly as the main course.131
This was one of forty conversations that served as the basis for the
conviction of Gilberto Valle (Mhal52), an officer with the New York
City Police Department.132 Valle was convicted of conspiring with
three other individuals to kidnap, kill, and eat five women, includ-
ing his wife.133
131. Transcript of Record at 456-60, United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(No. 12-CR-0847), ECF No. 135.
132. See United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff ’d in part and
rev’d in part, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015).
133. See id.
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This may seem like damning evidence of a criminal conspiracy;
however, a number of complexities about this case caution against
using these disturbing conversations as conclusive evidence of
criminal intent.134 Valle met “Meatmarketman” and his other al-
leged coconspirators on the website Dark Fetish Net, which is
dedicated to a wide range of BDSM fantasies, including cannibal-
ism.135 On that site, Valle maintained a profile on which he put a
clear disclaimer that everything he discussed on the site was,
indeed, fantasy.136 He never met or spoke on the phone with any of
his alleged coconspirators.137 Indeed, his three alleged coconspira-
tors lived in New Jersey, England, and Pakistan.138 Quite signifi-
cantly, there was no oven, no house in the woods, no rotisserie, and
he was not single.139
Throughout his allegedly “real” chats, Valle provided conflicting,
false details about his own life: in certain conversations, he was an
experienced kidnapper soliciting new clients; in others, he was a
neophyte looking for guidance from more seasoned experts.140 He
never revealed, however, that he was a police officer with access to
a firearm and handcuffs.141 Importantly, although he was friendly
with a woman named Kimberly, he never used the alleged victims’
last names and repeatedly obfuscated or lied about their identifying
details.142 Moreover, the date of the “Labor Day cookout” and all oth-
er discussed kidnappings came and went without a passing mention
from any member of the conspiracy.143 Nonetheless, a jury convicted
Valle for both conspiring to kidnap and accessing an NYPD data-
base beyond his authorization.144 
There are signs that the verdict did not arise from the strength of
the evidence, but instead from disapproval of his dark fantasies. At
various points in the trial, prosecutors emphasized to jurors that
134. Thea Johnson and I have written more extensively about the Valle case elsewhere. See
Johnson & Gilden, supra note 4, at 313-14.
135. Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 59.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 59-60.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 60-61, 98-99.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 61-62.
142. See id. at 61.
143. Id. at 60; Johnson & Gilden, supra note 4, at 320.
144. Johnson & Gilden, supra note 4, at 320.
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Valle’s fantasies were “not ... OK” and “not normal” and implored
them to use their “common sense” when assessing the evidence.145
When later interviewed about the verdict, one juror explained, “We
were convinced he wanted to do it.”146
Fortunately for Valle, a year after his conviction, the district
judge overturned the jury’s verdict on the conspiracy charge, recog-
nizing that all of these conversations were pure fantasy and never
entered the realm of actual criminal conspiracy.147 On December 3,
2015, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Gardephe’s judgment of
acquittal on the kidnapping charge, largely adopting the reasoning
of his “thorough and thoughtful 118-page opinion.”148 The majority
was “loath to give the government the power to punish us for our
thoughts and not our actions. That includes the power to criminalize
an individual’s expression of sexual fantasies, no matter how
perverse or disturbing.”149 Nonetheless, by the time Valle was ac-
quitted, he had been denied bail and had spent twenty-one months
in jail, including seven in solitary confinement.150 Moreover, he lost
his job, his pension, and his child.151 And he has been publicly
ridiculed as the “Cannibal Cop” ever since.152
Valle’s case may seem like an extreme example of the criminal
justice system struggling to interpret evidence of online sexual
fantasy; however, this is far from the only case in which a criminal
145. Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 107-08.
146. Thought Crimes: The Case of the Cannibal Cop (HBO Documentary Films 2015).
147. Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 62. The Valle ruling is reminiscent of the earlier “Jake Baker”
case, in which a University of Michigan student was charged with communicating a threat
to kidnap or injure a young man, based upon a series of fictional stories on the Usenet group
“alt.sex.stories” and sexually explicit e-mails with an online buddy in Canada. See United
States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997). In that case, the district court threw
out the indictment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, observing that “Baker and Gonda
apparently sent e-mail messages to each other in an attempt to foster a friendship based on
shared sexual fantasies.” Id. Although Baker was never convicted (or actually tried) on the
threat charges, he was suspended from Michigan, was initially denied bail, and spent several
months in jail as a result of the charges. Adam S. Miller, The Jake Baker Scandal: A
Perversion of Logic, TRINCOLL J. (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.trincoll.edu/zines/tj/tj4.6.95/
articles/baker/html [https://perma.cc/6EM2-HYPP].
148. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 2015).
149. Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
150. Daniel Engber, An Exclusive Interview with the “Cannibal Cop,” SLATE (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/12/cannibal_cop_an_exclusive
_interview_with_gilberto_valle.html [https://perma.cc/DWV3-62CS].
151. See id.
152. See, e.g., id.
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defendant has been punished or otherwise disadvantaged by
discomfort, disgust, and confusion toward his online fantasy life.153
This Section will show various ways in which the criminal law has
blurred the lines between fantasy and reality in the face of dark or
disturbing evidence of online sexual fantasy. In the wake of To
Catch a Predator154-style panics surrounding online predators and
pedophiles, jurors, judges, and law enforcement have doubted,
punished, and arguably preyed upon sexual fantasy. 
One group of cases involved situations similar to Valle’s: dis-
turbing, sexually explicit conversations were used to show attempt
or conspiracy.155 In United States v. Hite, the fifty-eight-year-old
defendant entered a chat room on the website Gay.com and initiated
a conversation with someone named “DCped,” who described himself
as a “[n]o limit perv.”156 DCped was, in reality, an undercover D.C.
police officer.157 The two men began a series of conversations
discussing, in graphic detail, the sexual activities they wanted to
engage in with two minors with whom DCped (falsely) claimed to be
sexually active.158 The two men scheduled a time to meet in person,
but the defendant told DCped that “[a]ny of the conversation that
we have I’m sure on my end, and on your end also, has been totally
fantasy, and it’s just the two of us meeting Friday night to explore,
and you know, discuss various things, correct?”159 A few days later,
DCped offered to have sex with his nephew on webcam, which
sounded “fabulous” to the defendant.160 That night, the defendant
was arrested at a gas station near his home, and he was charged
with and convicted of attempted coercion and enticement of a mi-
nor.161 The jury rejected his argument that “he was engaged in
153. For an eerily prescient discussion of the criminalization of fantasy in the early days
of the Internet, see LAURA KIPNIS, BOUND AND GAGGED: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF
FANTASY IN AMERICA (1996) (discussing thirty-year conviction of two men for discussing
violent sexual fantasies with FBI agents they met through an online bulletin board).
154. To Catch a Predator (MSNBC 2004-2007).
155. For discussions about other areas of law, such as national security law, in which
attempt and conspiracy charges have been in tension with free speech principles, see
generally Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 122.
156. 769 F.3d 1154, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration in original).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1159 (alteration in original).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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fantasy and role-play and had no intention of engaging in sexual
activities with a real child.”162
In People v. Weston, the California Court of Appeals upheld a
conviction for attempting to commit a lewd and lascivious act with
a minor under fourteen years old.163 The defendant initiated a
conversation in an Internet Relay Chat room, “Little Girls Sex
Chat,” with an individual who claimed to be thirteen years old
(again, a police officer), engaged “her” in sexually explicit conversa-
tions for several weeks, and flew from Colorado to Moreno Valley,
California, to meet her.164 Although this may seem like pretty solid
evidence of his intent to sexually engage with the minor, the de-
fendant cited the following information to support his belief that he
was talking to an adult who fantasized about being a teenager: (1)
he looked up all of the information she had given him about her
address, name, and parents’ occupations, and determined they were
false and entirely inconsistent; (2) she (an adult decoy) had a much
older-sounding voice on the phone, and the phone number she used
was registered to a Korean woman in another city; and (3) the girl
accessed the Internet from a range of different telephone numbers
and ISP addresses, while claiming always to be at home.165
Although the appellate court acknowledged that “there was
evidence to support defendant’s ‘fantasy’ defense,” it held that the
jury could have reasonably concluded that it was not a fantasy,
based largely upon the frequent discussions of sexual activities
online and defendant’s travel to California.166 According to the court,
“regardless of whether evidence exists to support defendant’s
argument that he had good reason to believe Sheila13 was an adult,
the record supports the jury’s conclusion that defendant thought
Sheila13 was under 14 years of age.”167 As in the Valle case, jurors
were given the task of separating fantasy from reality, but here, the
California court refused to disturb the verdict, notwithstanding evi-
dence that placed their conclusion in doubt. Several other reported
162. Id.
163. No. E033065, 2003 WL 22251409, at *1, *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2003).
164. Id. at *1-3.
165. Id. at *3.
166. Id. at *5.
167. Id.
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decisions similarly acknowledged the potential viability of a fantasy
defense but refused to disturb the jury’s weighing of the evidence.168
A second group of cases involve questionable application of char-
acter propensity rules to allow juries to infer a defendant’s intent or
motive from evidence of sexual fantasy. Federal Rule of Evidence
404 and state law analogs prohibit the introduction of evidence of a
person’s character trait in order to show that they acted in confor-
mity with that trait.169 Nonetheless, in United States v. Curtin, the
Ninth Circuit allowed the government to introduce a series of sex-
ually explicit incest stories found on defendant’s PDA in order to
show that he intended to meet someone (a police officer) he believed
to be a thirteen-year-old girl.170 According to the government, the
stories allegedly disproved defendant’s argument that, as in Weston,
he believed he had been talking with an adult woman pretending to
be a minor; they showed “[w]hat his fantasies are and this shows his
168. United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2014) (“There is no single
action by the defendant in this case that clearly signifies that the defendant would follow
through on his sexual talk.... Were we the triers of fact, we might reach a conclusion different
from the district court.”); United States v. Laureys, 653 F.3d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“[Detective] Palchak admitted there was no implication in the chat that the girl would be
present at the initial meeting with Jim. Even so, the jury reasonably found Laureys’s trip to
meet Jim was for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor.” (citation
omitted)); United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The appellant’s chief
defense—that he was merely role-playing and thought that the communications were
mutually entertained fantasies, comfortably remote from any prospect of consummation—is
plausible. Moreover, that defense was buttressed by the appellant’s persistent dodging of
suggestions that he and his correspondents meet. But the government’s theory of the
case—that the appellant was engaged in earnest predation with persons he thought to be
minors—also was plausible.... In the end, everything depended upon which set of inferences
the jury chose to draw.”); Maloney v. State, 294 S.W.3d 613, 622 (Tex. App. 2009) (“[A]ppellant
contends that Brandy ‘displayed a maturity about sex and relationships uncharacteristic of
most thirteen-year-old girls.’ Appellant also...contends that Officer’s Yates’s [sic] voice was
‘unmistakably that of an adult woman.’ ... [W]e conclude that the evidence supporting the
conviction is not so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.”).
169. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
170. 489 F.3d 935, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (but remanding to the district court
with instructions to read the proffered stories in order to assess under FED. R. EVID. 403
whether their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect); see also United States v.
Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2006) (“As the government points out, ‘[t]hese images
provided a glimpse into Brand’s sexual interest in children and, as such, were highly
probative of whether he wanted to have sex with “Julie” or simply to give her voice lessons,
as Brand essentially contended at trial.’” (alteration in original)).
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intent.”171 The majority of the en banc court agreed.172
Judge Kleinfeld, however, concurring, pointed out the dangerous
slipperiness of allowing the government to point to a defendant’s
general fantasies as evidence of intent.173 Under the government’s
chain of reasoning, the stories revealed a sexual fantasy; the sexual
fantasy meant he was the type of person who would intend to act
upon them when given the chance, and therefore he intended to act
upon them when he met the police decoy.174 Under Rule 404 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, this reasoning inappropriately conflated
repugnant sexual fantasies with specifically intending to commit the
crime at issue.175 According to Judge Kleinfeld, the majority failed
to appreciate the crucial distinction between having, reading, and
writing about “disgusting” sexual fantasies and actually acting upon
those fantasies in an unlawful manner.176 Nonetheless, several cases
have followed the Curtin majority and held it proper to use sexually
explicit material as evidence of motive or intent.177
171. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 939-40 (alteration in original); see Weston, 2003 WL 22251409, at
84; see also Brand, 467 F.3d at 198 (“The child pornography found on Brand’s computer
certainly suggests just such an abnormal sexual attraction by Brand. Brand’s abnormal sexual
attraction encompassed not only possession of child pornography but the desire to meet a
young girl for a sexual encounter; the same urge that Brand satisfied by obtaining child
erotica also inclined Brand to commit sexual crimes against children.”). FED. R. EVID.
404(b)(2) allows introduction of “other acts” for a series of noncharacter propensity reasons,
for example to show “motive” or “intent.”
172. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 958-59.
173. Id. at 961-62 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 963 (“Perverse sexual desire is a trait of character. Using a person’s perverse
sexual fantasies to prove action in conformity therewith is exactly what subsection (a) of Rule
404 prohibits.”).
175. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of character trait to prove that
defendant acted in accordance with that character trait on a specific occasion).
176. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 960 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“Curtin had a First Amendment
right to possess and read the disgusting stories he downloaded from the internet and to
fantasize about the criminal sexual conduct they describe. He emphatically did not have a
right to attempt to persuade a person under 18 to have sex with him or to travel from Cali-
fornia to Nevada ‘for the purpose’ of having sex with a person under 18.” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2012))).
177. See United States v. Knope, 655 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2011) (allowing introduction
of previous online conversations with seven individuals claiming to be minors, including police
officers, to show that the defendant intended to have sex with the minor in the case at hand);
State v. Brown, 710 S.E.2d 265, 269-70 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (allowing introduction of a series
of erotic stories involving incest—“an uncommon and specific type of pornography”—to show
defendant’s motive and intent to molest his young daughter), aff’d, 722 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. 2012)
(mem.); see also Johnston v. State, 431 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Ark. 2014) (allowing the admission
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The last group of cases involves defendants’ allegations that they
were entrapped by chat room sting operations. Entrapment is an
affirmative defense that allows a defendant to show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the government induced him or her to
commit a crime.178 Even if the government induced the crime, how-
ever, it can still defeat an entrapment defense by showing beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime before the government approached him or her.179 Although
many “chat room sting” decisions acknowledge that the government
induced the charged crime, the government is sometimes able to use
a defendant’s fantasies and desires to show predisposition.
In United States v. Brand the defendant was charged with trav-
eling across state lines for the purposes of illicit sexual conduct with
a minor, as well as enticement of a minor, based upon a series of
sexually explicit conversations he had with “Sara” and “Julie.”180
Sara and Julie were fictitious minors created jointly by an FBI
Agent and a “private citizen.”181 The Second Circuit held that there
was sufficient evidence that Brand was predisposed to commit the
charged crimes because he had logged into an “I Love Older Men”
chat room—“a chat room with a very suggestive name”—and previ-
ously had sexually explicit conversations with other police officers
of incest-related website names and images when the defendant was the victim’s father);
People v. Dean, No. B192974, 2008 WL 376226, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008) (admitting
seven pornographic photos of “relatively young women” found on appellant’s computer); State
v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 13, 16 (Iowa 2014) (admitting two videos depicting the sexual abuse
of very young children); Commonwealth v. Carey, 974 N.E.2d 624, 633 (Mass. 2012)
(permitting introduction of photos that mirrored the method by which the defendant allegedly
assaulted the victim); State v. Gaines, 667 S.E.2d 728, 732 (S.C. 2008) (admitting defendant’s
sexually explicit online chat conversation with a young female).
178. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
179. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 554 (1992). This is the “subjective” test
for entrapment adopted by the federal government and most states. Joseph A. Colquitt,
Rethinking Entrapment, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1394, 1400 (2004). Other states, like
California, have adopted a more “objective” test under which the defendant’s predisposition
is much less relevant. See People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979) (asking whether
“the conduct of the law enforcement agent [was] likely to induce a normally law-abiding
person to commit the offense”).
180. 467 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2006).
181. Id. at 183. The private citizen, Stephanie Good, was a “55-year-old woman who spen[t]
20 to 50 hours a week surfing the Internet for those she believe[d] to be sexual predators and
reporting her finds to the FBI.” United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2008),
abrogated by United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2011).
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posing as young girls, viewed child pornography online, and
promptly responded when law enforcement brought up the topic of
sex for the first time.182
In United States v. Joseph, the Second Circuit allowed the
government to show predisposition to entice a minor (the same
fictitious “Julie” as in Brand)183 to engage in sexual activity by in-
troducing “devastating evidence” that the defendant was a member
of a website called “Muscleteens.”184 This website featured girls and
young women, both over and under eighteen years of age, with well-
developed muscles.185
In People v. Grizzle, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the
defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction as to an entrapment
defense, even though there was little evidence that he was predis-
posed to attempt the sexual assault of a child.186 The defendant
believed that he was chatting online with an adult female pretend-
ing to be thirteen, and at one point “she” sent him a photo of, in the
words of the court, “a youthful-looking but obviously adult female
deputy sheriff.”187 Moreover, the court observed that “[i]t is, perhaps,
inevitable that such an [Internet sting] operation will ensnare an
otherwise law-abiding citizen with sexual fantasies—involving
conduct which is illegal, immoral, taboo, or all three—upon which
he or she would not otherwise act were the opportunity not pre-
sented to them.”188
Nonetheless, the defendant was not entitled to an entrapment
defense because he “did not admit the culpable mental state”
necessary to convict on the attempt charges.189 In other words, he
could not claim the affirmative defense of entrapment because he
did not admit to intending to have sex with or entice an actual
minor; he merely admitted to intending to have sex with someone
182. Brand, 467 F.3d at 194-95.
183. 542 F.3d at 14-15 (identifying the same FBI agent and private citizen as in Brand).
184. Id. at 20-21 (“Although admission of the Muscleteens photos was not erroneous, if they
become relevant at a retrial, the defendant must be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence that he did not view them.”).
185. Id. at 20.
186. 140 P.3d 224, 227 (Colo. App. 2006).
187. Id. at 225.
188. Id. at 227.
189. Id.
2016] PUNISHING SEXUAL FANTASY 455
fantasizing that she was a minor.190 He was convicted of attempted
sexual assault because the jury did not believe his argument that he
only fantasized about illegal, immoral, or taboo fantasies, and he
could not challenge the police conduct that exposed those fantasies
to prosecution because he would not admit to actually intending to
turn those fantasies into reality.191 
Although courts have been willing to reject entrapment argu-
ments or predisposition when confronted with taboo sexual fanta-
sies, they have been more receptive to fantasy defenses when the
court could in some way relate or sympathize with the defendant’s
desires and actions. In People v. Aguirre, for example, a California
Court of Appeal overturned the defendant’s convictions when the
trial court had not sua sponte instructed the jury on entrapment:
The police lured defendant into an electronic conversation with
Jess without providing any indication at the outset that she was
underage. Indeed, the police conducted their sting on a Craigs-
list forum that is supposed to be limited to users age 18 and
over. The police quickly disclosed Jess was 13 years old once de-
fendant contacted her, but in response to defendant’s request for
a picture of Jess, the police selected a photograph of an attrac-
tive and mature female body.192
The court, apparently, could imagine this scenario appealing to a
“normally law-abiding person”:
The forum and photograph selected by the police, along with the
flirtatious and prurient “personality” displayed by Jess, contrib-
uted to an ambiguous and titillating scenario in which a
normally law-abiding person who was seeking consensual sex
with a woman on an internet forum might be enticed to pursue
a fictional underage girl.193
Another set of cases in which courts have been more receptive to
entrapment defenses involve “sexual mentor” stings, in which law
190. Id. at 226.
191. Id.
192. No. G045009, 2012 WL 1132777, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2012), modified on denial
of reh’g (Apr. 27, 2012).
193. Id.
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enforcement pretend to be a parent looking for another adult to
have sex with her minor daughter or son.194 Courts’ concern in these
cases appears to be that the defendants are really interested in a
relationship with the adult, and that law enforcement is using that
desire as leverage to push him toward the minor.195
According to one court, “[t]he ‘sexual mentor’ version of internet
sting operations directed at pedophiles can be problematic because
some targets of the operation may feel pressured to agree to ‘teach’
a child about sex in the hope of obtaining a sexual relationship with
the child’s older relative.”196 It may make sense that an adult wom-
an would have greater coercive force on an adult man than a
teenage girl, but it is easy to forget that trained police officers are
behind many of these fictional paramours. The law enforcement
officers in these cases are trying to locate individuals with taboo
sexual fantasies and see if they can get them to cross the line into
potentially harmful conduct. Whether that line has been crossed,
and the propriety of law enforcement activity, should not depend on
how sympathetic the defendant’s fantasy happens to be.
One court has suggested “the government should not be in the
business of testing the will of law-abiding citizens with elaborate (if
improbable) fantasies of sensuous teenagers desperate to engage in
sexual acts with random middle-aged men.”197 Nonetheless, this is
often the very business in which it is engaged. In United States v.
Larson, the court captured the logic behind the investigation and
prosecution of sexually charged Internet forums:
Identifying individuals who offer children for sex or who seek to
procure children for sex without the use of the Internet is dif-
ficult, as those crimes typically occur in secret. Sexual assault of
children arranged by adults is made easier by the Internet. The
anonymity of the Internet adds a new layer of secrecy to a crime
194. See United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing
defendant’s conviction on entrapment grounds); Mizner v. State, 154 So. 3d 391, 394 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (describing how law enforcement posed online as a mother seeking a
sexual mentor for her ten-year-old daughter), appeal denied, No. SC14-2380, 2016 WL
1669708 (Fla. Apr. 27, 2016). But see United States v. Larson, No. 12-CR-00886-BLF-1, 2015
WL 729738, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss for outrageous
government conduct).
195. See Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 698-700.
196. Mizner, 154 So. 3d at 393 n.1.
197. Aguirre, 2012 WL 1132777, at *7.
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committed in the shadows of society. Therefore, as the defense
expert acknowledges, the government frequently uses on-line
undercover investigations as a means of identifying persons
involved in the exploitation of children.198
As reflected in this passage, the cases surveyed above view Internet
fantasy as a useful and accurate proxy for actual sexual coercion
and exploitation. 
The problem with this logic is that it collapses two distinct
questions—whether the defendant was sexually aroused by the
illegal actions he discussed, and whether he was predisposed to
actually commit the actions themselves absent government in-
volvement.199 Whether framed as attempt, motive, conspiracy, or
predisposition, these opinions repeatedly conflate sexual desire with
some form of criminal intent. In many of these cases, the evidence
might reasonably show, as in the “Cannibal Cop” case, that the de-
fendant “wanted to do it.”200 However, there is often no evidence that
the defendant had ever done so before or was in a position to actual-
ly do so before the government created a fake persona designed to
198. 2015 WL 729738, at *9.
199. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 519-20 (2d Cir. 2015) (“As with his chats and
emails, Valle’s Internet searches show that he was interested in committing acts of sexualized
violence against women. Interest may be relevant evidence of intent, but it does not by itself
prove intent.”); United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 545 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hether this
was a fantasy or carry-out, you know, history is full of individuals who start off with fantasies
and end up with the reality of carrying out those fantasies.” (quoting the district court’s
sentencing discussion)); United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“Curtin’s possession in his PDA of this material at the time of his intended encounter with
Christy clearly illuminated his thoughts and his subjective intent to carry out his
daddy/daughter sexual initiation escapades with a juvenile, not an adult.”). In United States
v. Gladish, Judge Posner emphasized the distinction between desire and attempt where the
defendant was convicted for online enticement without taking a “substantial step” toward
actually engaging the minor in person. 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The requirement
of proving a substantial step serves to distinguish people who pose real threats from those
who are all hot air; in the case of Gladish, hot air is all the record shows.”); accord United
States v. Farley, No. 3:14CR21, 2014 WL 4809453, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2014) (“The evi-
dence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Farley actually planned to meet Bosnich
or to engage in sexual conduct with her. Although Farley talks a good game, he lives in a
fantasy world. Farley liked to talk to girls in sexual terms, but it was nothing more than role
playing.”).
200. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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push the defendant toward taking one step too far for the very first
time.201
Making a distinction between desire and intent is by no means
an effort to defend or normalize pedophilia, incest, or sexual
violence. Nonetheless, there is an important distinction between
what turns a person on and whether they are foreseeably likely to
engage in harmful and illegal sexual activity.202 There is certainly
a risk that desire and fantasy can spill over into coercive, harmful
acts against an actual victim; but, again, the harms prevented in
these cases are often speculative, as opposed to imminent or
reasonably foreseeable, particularly given that the “victim” at issue
201. See, e.g., United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven if
Gagliardi could establish government inducement, and even if he had never before exhibited
pedophilic tendencies, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that he
stood ready and willing to violate § 2422(b).”); see also Gerald Dworkin & David Blumenfeld,
Punishment for Intentions, 75 MIND 396, 396 (1966) (“[N]o person should be punished unless
he is guilty of having committed some wrong act. We punish a man for attempted murder but
not for wanting to murder.”). One court has appreciated this distinction between fantasy, or
desire more generally, and intent. See People v. Walter, 810 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004) (“Hope and fantasy do not equal intent, even if they lead to actions that could make the
fantasy come true. Every man going on a blind date with a condom in his wallet might hope
to have sex, but that does not mean he intends to have sex.”). In that case, however, two of
the three judges seemed particularly comfortable overturning a conviction where the
conversations between the defendant and the (actual) minor were never explicitly sexual until
the police became involved. Id. at 630.
202. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 961 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“Shymanovitz [overruled by the
majority] explained that the possession of male homosexual pornography tended to prove that
the defendant ‘had an interest in looking at gay male pornography, reading gay male erotica,
or perhaps even, reading erotic stories about men engaging in sex with underage boys.’ It did
not prove ‘that he actually engaged in, or even had a propensity to engage in, any sexual
conduct of any kind.’” (quoting Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998)));
RICHARD G. WRIGHT, SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICES, NEW DIRECTIONS 150 (2009)
(“Law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and supporters of Internet sex stings assume that
Internet sexual curiosity about adult-child sex will in a definitive causal chain lead to child
sexual abuse.”); Margo Kaplan, Taking Pedophilia Seriously, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75, 78,
84 (2015) (distinguishing between individuals who have a sexual interest in children and
those who take the further step of acting out that interest); McLeod, supra note 12, at 1594
(arguing that the link between arousal and activity is “tenuous at best”). As Gerald Dworkin
and David Blumenfeld observed, “To have an intention to do X, as opposed, say, to having a
fantasy of doing X, IS to be prepared to take steps to do X given the chance.” Dworkin &
Blumenfeld, supra note 201, at 400; see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D
Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141, 1240 (2008) (“[I]t
is not obviously true that dreams or fantasies in which someone enjoys engaging in torture
or committing another deeply immoral act are generally indicative ... of either a desire to do
the real thing or a capacity to take pleasure in doing the real thing.”).
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is often fictional.203 In many of these cases, law enforcement is not
simply harshly treating evidence of dark sexual fantasy as they find
it. Instead, it is enacting, rooting out, and then punishing the very
fantasies that people are not supposed to have.204
In order to justify this conflation of desire and intent, the judges
and prosecutors in the cases canvassed above consistently spell out
the lurid details of what were seemingly private online conversa-
tions. The opinions in these cases are deeply uncomfortable to read,
and I have opted not to include many of the sexual positions, co-
ercive acts, and bodily fluids painstakingly described in published
judicial opinions. The logic seems to be that by showing that this
person talked and read about doing horrific things with and to
women and children, we can reasonably use our common sense and
conclude that they intended to do those things.205 As Judge Kleinfeld
observed in Curtin, however, “Good prosecution proves that the
defendant committed the crime. Bad prosecution proves that the
defendant is so repulsive he ought to be convicted whether he com-
mitted it or not.”206
The Internet may provide a window into some of the darkest
corners of sexual desire, and it is very difficult not to pass some sort
of judgment on the people whose conversations come to the atten-
tion of the court. But it is precisely at these moments when legal
commitments to objectivity are at their most important; judges and
prosecutors may never be able to just call balls and strikes, but the
same principles that supposedly apply to drugs, theft, violence, and
203. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 122, at 1694 (“[G]rounding criminal liability
based on some unquantifiable risk that the speech may lead to sexual abuse is an unjustified
expansion of the criminal law.”).
204. See STOCKTON, supra note 38, at 38 (“This child voice that police send out to
‘pedophiles’ in order to ‘catch’ them is the voice of childhood that the law denies.”).
205. The following colloquy illustrates this logic:
Now, [defense counsel] again took a lot of time talking about there’s nothing
wrong with chatting, this was all a fantasy. But again remember I asked you to
keep [in] your mind the kind of character and person that could envision in their
mind being with a 13-year-old sexually. This man by his own admission is
fantasizing involved in a role play involving a girl in considering the concept that
when he’s f—king her, she’s going to start to bleed. That’s who this man is. In
his mind, according to him, he can envision these scenarios and play them out
and he’s envisioning her bleeding through this.
State v. Nandy, No. A-1659-08T4, 2010 WL 3932793, at *16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct.
8, 2010) (alteration in original).
206. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 963 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
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fraud207 should be extended to the policing and punishment of sex-
uality.208 Given the identity, speech, and associational interests
triggered by sexual fantasy, if anything, the lines between thoughts
and crime deserve particularly careful treatment in this domain.
When confronted with uncensored, disturbing sexual turn-ons, it
may be tempting for juries and judges to respond by locking up the
person and consequently the perceived problem with him. However,
this approach both runs afoul of free speech and due process com-
mitments and futilely minoritizes the nonnormative desires exposed
in the microscopically small slice of sexual fantasies that end up in
court.
III. TROUBLES WITH PUNISHING SEXUAL FANTASY
In the cases above, legal actors appear able to see only the
potential harms in interactive explorations of sexual fantasy: harms
to children from their mother’s sexual desires, harms to children
themselves from presenting themselves in a sexual manner, and
harms to third parties from dark fetishes. Although the potential for
harm is certainly present in each scenario, there is often no demon-
stration of actual or likely harm to a third party.
This Section challenges the tendency and willingness to conflate
sexual fantasy with evidence of harm. First, this dynamic under-
mines free speech values—the First Amendment does not permit
state actors to decide what types of consensual conversations people
can have, no matter how gruesome and valueless they may appear.
Second, this dynamic sidelines the potential benefits of the Internet
207. Criminal law scholars have observed, however, that issues of bias both pervade the
criminal justice system generally, and can infect specific issues surrounding the burdens of
proof, standards of review, and evidentiary rules discussed herein. See generally Chris
Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule
404(b) Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQUALITY 1 (2007); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); Casey Reynolds, Student Article, Implicit Bias and
the Problem of Certainty in the Criminal Standard of Proof, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229
(2013).
208. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 710 S.E.2d 265, 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“Pornography,
especially such singularly specific pornography like Family Letters, provides an obvious
inference about the sexual motivations of the possessor in a way that other reading material
cannot.”), aff’d, 722 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. 2012) (mem.); id. at 279 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (“The
Family Letters publication cannot be relevant to Brown’s propensity to commit a sex offense
without inferring he has a depraved sexual interest in incest.”).
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for exploring sexual fantasies, particularly regarding nonnormative
sexual desires. Third, efforts to police and punish sexual fantasy are
misaligned with empirically supported data about the actual risks
of sexual harm and the Internet.
A. Free Speech and First Amendment Protections for Fantasy
The scenarios outlined above are at odds with the First Amend-
ment framework for distinguishing fantasy from reality, as set forth
by the U.S. Supreme Court.209 In Jacobson v. United States, the
Court overturned a child pornography conviction where the govern-
ment failed to proffer sufficient evidence of predisposition to commit
the charged conduct: 
Petitioner’s responses to the many communications prior to the
ultimate criminal act were at most indicative of certain personal
inclinations, including a predisposition to view photographs of
preteen sex and a willingness to promote a given agenda by
supporting lobbying organizations. Even so, petitioner’s re-
sponses hardly support an inference that he would commit the
crime of receiving child pornography through the mails. Further-
more, a person’s inclinations and “fantasies ... are his own and
beyond the reach of government.”210
The Court recognized that a sexual attraction to unlawful activities
and related fantasies are distinct from intent to actually break the
law by engaging in those activities.211 Even though a person’s fan-
tasies may show a predisposition to reading and writing about
unlawful, harmful, or coercive sex, free speech commitments
mandate that such expressive or imaginative activities—no matter
how objectionable—be decoupled from conduct that is likely to
209. This is not to say, of course, that the Court has been perfectly consistent in its free
speech jurisprudence. Nonetheless, there are a number of important principles that arise
repeatedly in First Amendment case law and have not been fully appreciated by lower courts
addressing Internet-mediated sexuality.
210. 503 U.S. 540, 551-52 (1992) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973)).
211. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s First
Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between ideas and
conduct.”).
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negatively impact other people.212 Speech is by no means inherently
harmless,213 and the speech/conduct distinction is hardly crystal
clear,214 but fantasy, expression, and imagination at the very least
require clear-headed, particularized, and empirically supported
justifications for legal regulation and punishment.215
The First Amendment protects pure fantasy—reading and writing
about activities that could absolutely be punished if they occurred
in the physical world. Fourth Circuit Judge Gregory, dissenting
from an opinion finding a set of pedophilic stories to be obscene,
observed that some of the most highly regarded books and movies,
including Lolita216 and American Beauty,217 delve extensively into
unlawful sexual fantasies.218 From his perspective, “the iconic books
and movies above render unsustainable the claim that writings de-
scribing sexual acts between children and adults, generated by
fantasy, have no demonstrated socially redeeming artistic value.”219
He noted that even though “Whorley’s e-mail fantasies, if carried to
fruition, would undoubtedly subject him to criminal liability ... [his]
actions can easily be separated from the potentially illegal acts
about which he fantasized.”220
212. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[A] bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment ... is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
213. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL.,
WORDS THAT WOUND (1993).
214. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 855-58 (2012); Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 777 (2001); John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496 (1975).
215. See Kahan et al., supra note 214, at 857 (“[I]f the selectivity with which the
government prohibits such assaultive behavior reflects a ‘special hostility towards the par-
ticular biases thus singled out,’ punishment of such conduct reflects exactly the sort of
disapproval of ideas that the First Amendment is meant to proscribe.” (quoting R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992))).
216. NABAKOV, supra note 21.
217. AMERICAN BEAUTY (DreamWorks Pictures 1999).
218. United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 349 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(listing materials such as Lolita, Fifty Shades of Grey, The Tudors, Basic Instinct, Janet
Jackson’s “Wardrobe Malfunction,” and Miley Cyrus’ “twerking”).
219. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 349 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220. Id. at 349-50; see also United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“[Defendant] had a First Amendment right to possess and
read the disgusting stories he downloaded from the internet and to fantasize about the
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Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions have hammered home
that, outside the very specific confines of obscenity law, disgust is an
impermissible basis for regulating speech that does not pose a
reasonably imminent threat of harm to another person. In Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court struck down a
California statute prohibiting the sale of violent video games to
minors.221 The statute expressly targeted some of the most gruesome
types of games—those in which the options involve the player
“killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image
of a human being.”222 Nonetheless, the Court emphasized, again,
that the First Amendment consistently protects objectionable, of-
fensive expression: “esthetic and moral judgments about art and
literature ... are for the individual to make, not for the Government
to decree.”223 In the context of video games, it was insufficient for
the government to point either to the desire to protect minors or to
the inherently interactive nature of the content. The Court noted
that “the books we give children to read [such as Grimm’s Fairy
Tales, Lord of the Flies, and Dante’s Inferno] ... contain no shortage
of gore.”224 
The majority opinion in Brown took particular issue with Justice
Alito’s dissent, which included “considerable independent research”
to identify particularly gruesome video games, in which victims
were, for example, dismembered, decapitated, and disemboweled.225
The majority noted that “Justice Alito recounts all these disgusting
video games in order to disgust us—but disgust is not a valid basis
for restricting expression.”226 The Court suggested that Justice
Alito’s goal was to “arouse the reader’s ire, and the reader’s desire
criminal sexual conduct they describe.”); Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 26 (“A man’s thoughts are
his own; he may sit in his armchair and think salacious thoughts, murderous thoughts,
discriminatory thoughts, whatever thoughts he chooses, free from the ‘thought police.’ It is
only when the man gets out of his armchair and acts upon his thoughts that the law may
intervene.” (footnotes omitted)); Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3, 7 (1998) (“Everyone is entitled to commit murder in the imagination once in a while.”).
221. 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011).
222. Id. at 789.
223. Id. at 790 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818
(2000)).
224. Id. at 795-96.
225. Id. at 798.
226. Id.
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to put an end to this horrible message.”227 And this mode of argu-
ment cut to the core of the free speech dangers presented in the
case, namely, that “the ideas expressed by speech—whether it be
violence, or gore, or racism—and not its objective effects, may be the
real reason for governmental proscription.”228
In many of the cases surveyed in the previous sections, judges,
juries, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers were extremely
uncomfortable with, if not outright disgusted by, the sexual desires
laid bare before them: teenagers experimenting with their sexuality,
adults discussing their violent or pedophilic fantasies, parents
simultaneously raising kids while daring to have a sex life. And in
these circumstances, it is the ire and disgust—and not the “objective
effects”—that veer legal decision-making away from free speech and
due process commitments. Judicial opinions and prosecutors’ ar-
guments detail parties’ criminal, cringeworthy, and taboo sexual
desires as a way to justify carving out sexuality and the Internet
from other realms of potentially harmful human activities within
law’s purview.229 
A core message from First Amendment jurisprudence is that the
development and expression of ideas, no matter how uncomfortable
they might make us, are entitled to protection, notwithstanding the
evolution of communicative technologies.230 It is true that, unlike
227. Id. at 799.
228. Id.
229. This assumes that the speech at issue here would not fall within the relatively high
bar for establishing obscenity. I acknowledge, though, that obscenity law can and has been
manipulated to target minority sexual desires. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Essay, When
Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1380, 1385 (2008) (arguing generally that
obscenity laws have discriminated against homosexuals).
This is not the only area of contentious speech in which courts have deviated from the free
speech principles outlined in this section. See, e.g., Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 122, at
1669-70 (surveying decisions, such as United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013),
that criminalize online discussions of jihadist literature); Charis E. Kubrin & Erik Nielson,
Rap on Trial, 4 RACE & JUST. 185, 187 (2014) (documenting the use of rap lyrics to show
defendants’ guilt); Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 946 (2015)
(describing cases upholding bans on images of aborted fetuses because they “‘caused or could
cause psychological harm’ to children” (quoting Saint Johns Church in the Wilderness v. Scott,
296 P.3d 273, 284 (Col. App. 2012))).
230. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty:
Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2054 (2004)
(“The rise and adoption of a technology—like motion picture technology—changes our ideas
about what art is, what communication is, what identity is, what appearing ‘in public’ means,
and so on.”).
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readers and authors of books, the individuals in the cases surveyed
above are using Internet-enabled devices to explore fantasies in real
time with another person. From a First Amendment standpoint,
however, this marked increase in interactivity is not dispositive. For
example, although the video games at issue in Brown “enable[d]
participation in the violent action,” the Court observed that “all
literature is interactive.... ‘Literature when it is successful draws
the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters ...
[and] experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own.’”231
The interactive nature of video games did not require that they be
treated as qualitatively different, let alone removed from the reach
of strict scrutiny.232 In the virtual reality context, Professor Marc
Blitz has similarly observed that “[a] virtual world we construct
from our imagination should be no less protected than a drawing or
animation we create to give more vivid form to a dream sequence,
or a journal entry we use to reflect upon and revise our thoughts.”233
It may be difficult to appreciate the continuities between Internet
communications and more traditional media, not just due to the
increased interactivity of fantasy, but also due to fantasy’s increased
externalization. Even though a sexually charged book like Lolita234
or Fifty Shades of Grey235 might provoke and indulge a reader’s
fantasies, those fantasies often play out in the reader’s mind, be-
yond the reach of third-party surveillance. In the Internet context,
by contrast, fantasy often takes the form of written text, captured
on the user’s hard drive and stored on third-party servers.236 Several
First Amendment and privacy scholars have observed, however,
231. Brown, 564 U.S. at 798 (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d
572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)).
232. See Balkin, supra note 230, at 2056 (“[G]ames, particularly massively multiplayer
games and virtual worlds, have creative and interactive features that, in some ways, make
them even more like speech than motion pictures.”).
233. Blitz, supra note 202, at 1149 (arguing that certain acts, including “virtual joyrides
and sexual encounters ... should often count as First Amendment activity in virtual reality
even if they are not First Amendment ‘speech’ in the real world”); see also id. at 1208 (“Such
interactivity, considered by itself, provides no reason to eliminate or weaken the protection
that virtual encounters receive.”).
234. NABOKOV, supra note 21.
235. JAMES, supra note 22.
236. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008) (explaining
that through computers and electronic technologies, “[w]e are creating ... a record of our
intellectual activities—a close proxy for our thoughts—in unprecedented ways”).
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that monitoring, recording, or restricting externalized manifesta-
tions of thought and imagination can severely chill cognitive
processes at the core of free speech.237 Neil Richards, for example,
has persuasively linked free speech with the value of “intellectual
privacy.”238 As Richards notes, there is a “fundamental need for
privacy surrounding an individual’s intellectual explorations,” even
if those explorations take place on social media platforms or are
recorded on a third-party server.239
Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly lumped together interactive
texts with conduct that might imperil the well-being of young
children, sexually exploit teenagers, or pose real dangers to women’s
health and safety.240 As the law is increasingly presented with digi-
tized evidence of individuals’ intimate lives, the law has struggled
to view the data trails of fantasy as precisely that—external record-
ings of mental processes and not damning proof of the scenarios
described. With respect to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Curtin,
discussed above,241 Professor Richards drives home this point
powerfully: 
Reading even disturbing incest stories does not necessarily make
a person a child molester any more than owning a copy of
Natural Born Killers makes one a serial killer. While there may
certainly be a correlation between the reading or watching of
such materials and criminal intent, such a link is tenuous at
best.242
For sure, the risks and consequences of communication vary across
mediums,243 and the broad reach and relative permanency of
237. See, e.g., Blitz, supra note 202, at 1189; Richards, supra note 236, at 389 (“Surveillance
or interference can warp the integrity of our freedom of thought and can skew the way we
think, with clear repercussions for the content of our subsequent speech and writing.”); Daniel
J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 123 (2007)
(“The ability to keep personal papers and records of associational ties private is a central First
Amendment value.”).
238. Richards, supra note 236, at 417.
239. Id.
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
242. Richards, supra note 236, at 442 (footnote omitted).
243. Nevertheless, I am skeptical that it merits the diverging legal consequences in the
online and offline realms. For example, the federal crime of using the Internet to entice a
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity carries a ten-year statutory minimum sentence, even
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Internet communications are certainly relevant considerations when
designing legal regulations.244 But again, it is these harms that
must drive legal intervention and not “common sense,” moral intu-
itions about the underlying ideas and desires.245
On the issue of harms, Brown and the more recent decision in
United States v. Alvarez emphasize that the government really must
link prohibitions on expression to some real-world demonstration of
harm to others—the objective effects must be real.246 In Brown,
California argued that it did not need to show a “direct causal link”
between violent video games and harms to minors, and that it could
instead make a “predictive judgment that such a link exists, based
on competing psychological studies.”247 The Court rejected this
argument on the grounds that “ambiguous proof” would not suf-
fice.248 The studies cited by California showed “at best some
correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and
miniscule real-world effects” on children’s aggressive behavior, and
they did not sufficiently distinguish video games from other violent
if the attempt is unsuccessful and involves no coercion. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2012). If the
defendant were actually to succeed in having consensual sex with a minor, the resulting
statutory rape crimes would typically yield a much lighter sentence. See CHARLES PATRICK
EWING, JUSTICE PERVERTED: SEX OFFENDER LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 200-01
(2011).
244. Marc Blitz, pulling from work by Frederick Schauer, draws a useful distinction
between the First Amendment’s “coverage” of virtual spaces—whether it applies at all—and
its level of “protection”—the range of government interventions that it will permit. See Blitz,
supra note 202, at 1191 (quoting FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY 89 (1982)). The government may have powerful reasons for regulating certain types
of speech—for example, defamation or threats—but this is a different question from whether
the expression at issue is protected “speech” at all.
245. See id. at 1175 (arguing that virtual experiences should not be denied “First
Amendment protection unless there is powerful evidence that its effects on us are significantly
different (and more potentially harmful) than other creative activity”); id. at 1226 (“[P]rivate
visits to fantastic virtual landscapes will—in rare cases—be fair game for government
regulators not because of their alleged worthlessness, but because they do damage or have
substantial social consequence.”); Volokh, supra note 229, at 932 (“[I]t’s human nature to
think the worst of behavior we dislike, and predict various harmful effects that we wouldn’t
have predicted as to behavior we like.”).
246. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786, 800 (2011); see Volokh, supra note 229, at 930 (“But even under the secondary
effects approach, the government must indeed provide sufficient evidence that speech with
this particular content actually causes the asserted harms, and does so to an unusual
degree.”).
247. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
248. Id. at 800.
468 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:419
media.249 The law at issue accordingly punished the sale of a broad
category of speech that was both wildly overinclusive, when com-
pared to the demonstrated risk of harm, and wildly underinclusive
when compared to the range of other media that also explored grue-
some violence.250
In Alvarez, the Court similarly emphasized that speech could not
be proscribed solely due to its widely perceived moral failings.251 The
Court struck down a statute prohibiting lying about receiving a
Congressional Medal of Honor.252 The fact that such lies might often
lack perceived social value was not enough to justify the statute
without some additional showing of deception, coercion, reliance, or
related material harm.253
Although it might be argued that the Court’s laxer protections for
sexual as opposed to violent speech might justify punishing sexual
fantasy,254 even the highly punitive area of child pornography law
draws distinctions between the virtual and the real—the First
Amendment protects the former and categorically excludes the
latter.255 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court struck down
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which banned the
possession and distribution of child pornography that did not
contain actual minors, but instead used adults who looked like
minors or realistic computer-generated images of children.256 While
reaffirming Congress’s power to prohibit pornography containing
249. Id.
250. Id. at 802-05.
251. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546.
252. Id. at 2542-43.
253. Id. at 2545, 2547-48 (“Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse
alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was used
to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power unprece-
dented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.”); see also id. at 2555 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“[I]n virtually all these instances [in which lies can be prohibited,] limitations
of context, requirements of proof of injury, and the like, narrow the statute to a subset of lies
where specific harm is more likely to occur. The limitations help to make certain that the
statute does not allow its threat of liability or criminal punishment to roam at large, dis-
couraging or forbidding the telling of the lie in contexts where harm is unlikely or the need
for the prohibition is small.”).
254. See generally Kaplan, supra note 35, at 99-115 (summarizing and rejecting arguments
for treating sexual speech categorically differently than violent speech).
255. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239-40, 258 (2002) (striking down a 
ban on “virtual” child pornography).
256. Id.
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actual minors, the Court also reaffirmed a number of useful prin-
ciples for shielding such “virtual child pornography” under the First
Amendment.257
First, even highly objectionable content can trigger considerable
free speech interests.258 According to the Court, “[b]oth themes—
teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse of children—have
inspired countless literary works,”259 including Romeo and Juliet260
and the movies Traffic261 and American Beauty.262 Second, no chil-
dren were even arguably harmed in the production of this content,263
and it was insufficient for the government to argue that it might
“whet[ ] the [sexual] appetites of pedophiles.”264 The Court further
noted that “Congress may pass valid laws to protect children from
abuse .... The prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify
laws suppressing protected speech.”265 Instead, the First Amend-
ment demanded some reasonably proximate harm to flow from the
speech—“contingent and indirect” harms are insufficient.266 Third,
the Court rejected the argument that, because it was difficult to
distinguish between real and virtual child pornography, the gov-
ernment needed to be empowered to prosecute both.267 In other
words, even though it may be difficult to separate out the virtual
from the real, and possession of the virtual may provide a potential
proxy for possession of the real, the First Amendment required the
government to tease apart expression that did and did not pose
some direct harm to third parties.268
257. Id. at 245-46.
258. Id. at 245 (“It is also well established that speech may not be prohibited because it
concerns subjects offending our sensibilities.”).
259. Id. at 246-47.
260. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET.
261. TRAFFIC (Universal Pictures 2000).
262. AMERICAN BEAUTY (DreamWorks Pictures 1999).
263. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249-50 (“Ferber upheld a prohibition on the distribution and sale
of child pornography, as well as its production, because these acts were ‘intrinsically related’
to the sexual abuse of children.” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982))).
264. Id. at 253.
265. Id. at 245; see also id. at 253 (“The government may not prohibit speech because it
increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’”
(quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam))).
266. Id. at 250 (“The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon
some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts.”).
267. Id. at 254-55 (“This analysis turns the First Amendment upside down.”).
268. See id.
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The practice of punishing online fantasy runs afoul of these
principles.269 Although the actions surveyed above do not expressly
prohibit speech in the way that the statutes did in Brown, Alvarez,
and Ashcroft, the same concerns are raised by state actors’ failure
to meaningfully scrutinize parties’ actions for evidence of the feared
harm. Although there are certainly concerns and risks about
Internet behavior’s disinhibiting effect and actual spillover into
criminal behavior, this, as in Brown, is often highly speculative and
sometimes—for example in the child custody context—in tension
with other evidence before the court. Courts, juries, and law en-
forcement repeatedly conflate fantasy with harm, with little
acknowledgment of the potential for punishment to deter valu-
able—even if also uncomfortable or objectionable—expressive
activity. As introduced in Part I and discussed further below, there
is potential social and psychological value in providing safe space to
explore taboo sexual fantasies, and the false conflation of desire and
harm produces government action that is wildly overinclusive with
respect to protecting minors from harm, and wildly underinclusive
with respect to social contexts in which individuals explore taboo
desires and fantasy.270
Legal actors frequently lose sight of the fact that often no one
actually has been harmed by the defendant/aggrieved party’s
conduct; for example, a substantial number of the chat room sex
offender cases involve solely virtual—not actual—minors.271 Law
enforcement justifies its use of virtual minors/adult decoys by
emphasizing the difficulty of investigating sexual abuse and the
importance of ensuring that virtual pedophiles do not become actual
sex offenders.272 This is, however, precisely the type of fantasy-as-
proxy justification that the Court rejected in Ashcroft.273 Even in the
face of difficult, blurry line drawing, the government cannot simply
269. In the wake of Ashcroft, some courts arguably have still punished virtual child porn-
ography through generally applicable obscenity laws. See Bryan Kim-Butler, Fiction, Culture
and Pedophilia: Fantasy and the First Amendment After United States v. Whorley, 34 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 545, 548-49 (2011).
270. See supra Part I.
271. See supra Part II.C.
272. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
273. See Hessick, supra note 36, at 884 (“Even if some—or many—of those who possess
child pornography also abuse children, we ought not punish all possessors for such abuse
without actually proving that they have committed a contact offense.”).
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throw up its hands and speculate about some future fantasy
spillover.274 As observed by one court in the relatively early days of
Internet law, “[w]hile new technology such as the Internet may
complicate analysis and may sometimes require new or modified
laws, it does not in this instance qualitatively change the analysis
under the statute or under the First Amendment.”275
Nonetheless, courts facing a prosecution of purported sexual
fantasy have repeatedly sidelined First Amendment concerns. For
example, in Maloney v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
upheld a statute providing that “an accused cannot defend against
an online solicitation of a minor charge by asserting that he was
engaged in a fantasy.”276 It rejected defendant’s argument that the
statute prohibited constitutionally protected fantasy and restricted
freedom of expression and thought:
[T]his case presents circumstances in which the legitimate goal
of the statute far exceeds any potential unlawful applications.
The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
addressed by the Texas online solicitation of a minor statute
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance....
[T]he incidence of the State seeking to prosecute two consenting
adults engaging in online role playing or “fantasy” would likely
be exceedingly low.... [W]e have been given no basis to believe
that prosecutions of consenting adults engaging in role-playing
would amount to any more than a “tiny fraction” of all prosecu-
tions under the statute.277
This reasoning, and its casual dismissal of online “fantasy,” is high-
ly troubling. First, its core assumption—that the government would
274. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[A] ban upon consti-
tutionally protected speech may not be upheld on the theory that ‘law enforcement is hard,’
and the State may not punish speech simply because that speech increases the chance that
‘a pervert’ might commit an illegal act ‘at some indefinite future time.’” (footnote omitted)
(first quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 254 (2002), then quoting Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam))).
275. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1390 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (footnote omitted),
aff ’d sub nom. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
276. 294 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
277. Id. at 628 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Dwinells, 508
F.3d 63, 70-71 (1st Cir. 2007) (“But there is no realistic danger that section 2422(b), as we
have interpreted it, criminalizes protected speech.”).
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rarely, if ever, go after adults engaging in fantasy—is flatly incor-
rect. As Part II demonstrated, many people have been punished
harshly for engaging in sexual fantasies when no minor was ever
involved, let alone harmed.278 Second, it is not enough to simply
point to a concern for protecting minors to justify criminalizing
sexual role-playing. As Ashcroft and Brown emphasize, the govern-
ment has a duty to tailor its efforts to protect minors to actions that
are demonstrably linked to real-world harms, even if the speech at
issue is taboo, offensive, or disgusting to many observers.279 The
Maloney court had faith that the government would not intrude on
legitimate expression.280 But there is no reason to believe anyone in
the decision-making chain—law enforcement, prosecutor, judge, or
jury—will do the difficult, but crucial, work of (1) identifying the
actual harms posed by the conduct at issue, (2) recognizing the po-
tential value of speech they dislike, and (3) disentangling questions
of speech and harm from panicked, misleading discourses of online
sexual predators.
B. Social Science and Sexual Fantasy
Aside from free speech commitments, there are strong psy-
chological and cultural reasons not to conflate interactive fantasy
with conduct that harms actual people.281 A substantial body of so-
cial psychology literature shows a more sympathetic, and at least
more complicated, story about explorations of fantasy and desire
online.
It is important to clarify the purpose of looking to social science
here, particularly in light of the long history of the legal system
using social science to criminalize and harshly punish sexual
278. See supra notes 155-98 and accompanying text.
279. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804-05 (2011); Ashcroft, 535 U.S.
at 250-51. Indeed, in Ashcroft, the district court upheld the Child Pornography Prevention Act
on the ground that it was highly unlikely that any adaptation of sexual works like Romeo and
Juliet would be prosecuted. 535 U.S. at 242-43.
280. See Maloney, 294 S.W.3d at 628.
281. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 202, at 149 (“Sexuality and sexual fantasies are replete
with instances of curiosity, desire, testing of boundaries, fears, guilt, excitement, and moral
calculations. Whether it involves marriage partners of 40 years or a young adult with many
sexual partners, there are many cases in which an individual does not always act on their
sexual feelings.”).
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practices—such as homosexuality—that are now routinely under-
stood as healthy.282 This questionable use of social science continues
even in the contemporary decisions canvassed above; recall that
family law judges have denied parents custody based upon outdated
psychiatric classification of BDSM desires.283 Accordingly, I am
wary of using social science in order to make any bold “truth” claims
about the nature of sexuality or sexual fantasy to conclude whether
Internet-mediated fantasy is fundamentally healthy.
The studies surveyed below, however, can serve a more modest
purpose of complicating or pushing back against “common sense”
about the Internet and sexuality, which sees only the potential for
harm. The existing literature cannot show—nor does it purport to
show—that exploring sexual fantasy online is an unmitigated “good”
or sideline the potential for addiction, disinhibition, and social isola-
tion that can indeed coincide with extensive Internet use.284 But it
can push back against the intuition that those engaging in taboo
sexual fantasy are inherently “bad” or “dangerous” people and that
the legal system should not care about the chilling effects of policing
Internet sexuality. Even though the Internet has been shown to
facilitate a range of antisocial behaviors,285 it has also been shown
to provide a range of benefits to individuals developing or coming to
grip with their sexualities.286 Just as the First Amendment does not
protect speech because it is inherently “good,” but instead because
“bad” (that is, hateful, violent, indecent) speech is often a part of
282. See supra Part II.
283. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECH-
NOLOGY AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 11-13 (2011); Adam N. Joinson, Disinhibition and the
Internet, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INTERNET: INTRAPERSONAL, INTERPERSONAL, AND TRANS-
PERSONAL IMPLICATIONS 75, 75-76 (Jayne Gackenbach ed., 2d ed. 2007); Daria J. Kuss et al.,
Internet Addiction in Students: Prevalence and Risk Factors, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 959,
959-60 (2013).
285. See, e.g., TURKLE, supra note 284, at 154-57; Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Introduction to THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 1, 2-5 (Saul
Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (introducing a series of essays discussing how
speech on the internet “harasses, bullies, threatens, defames, invades privacy, and inflicts
reputational damage as well as emotional distress”).
286. See TURKLE, supra note 284, at 151-53.
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social practices we value,287 there is a risk that demonizing abhor-
rent sexual fantasies will disrupt valuable identity practices.
A number of studies have shown that the Internet can help
individuals explore and clarify their desires in ways not otherwise
available in their physical community.288 Much of this literature has
focused on LGBT youth and young adults, who have used the In-
ternet as a central component of their “coming out” process.289
Through exploring chat rooms, blogs, discussion forums, and porno-
graphic websites, LGBT youth are able to gain exposure to sexual
practices usually unavailable outside of urban cores,290 learn the
“sexual scripts” employed by LGBT adults,291 and ultimately make
decisions about whether to take their desires offline.292
Although LGBT people particularly may benefit from such self-
discovery, this interest potentially extends to a broader range of
sexual desires.293 For example, often missing from discussions of
sexting is the potential for such activities to serve as a relatively
empowering venue for teenagers to experiment sexually. Amy
Hasinoff ’s work has shown that teenage girls, in particular, can
exert agency and autonomy in digital spaces that they often lack in
physical ones.294 Again, this is not to deny the considerable risks of
287. See Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized some First Amendment protection for the speech
process, and not merely the expressive end product.”).
288. See, e.g., Daneback & Ross, supra note 56, at 126-27; Ross, supra note 6, at 344-45.
289. See, e.g., Lynne Hillier & Lyn Harrison, Building Realities Less Limited than Their
Own: Young People Practising Same-Sex Attraction on the Internet, 10 SEXUALITIES 82, 84-86
(2007).
290. See Chris Brickell, Sexuality, Power and the Sociology of the Internet, 60 CURRENT
SOC. 28, 31-32 (2012); McKenna et al., supra note 17, at 302; Nuno Nodin et al., Sexual Use
of the Internet: Perceived Impact on MSM’s Views of Self and Others, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y
719, 720-21 (2014).
291. See Pingel et al., supra note 7, at 459-60, 471-72 (concluding that Internet scripts
“offer[ ] [youth] an opportunity to explore their sexuality”); Ross, supra note 6, at 344; Allen
B. Thomas et al., Coming Out Online: Interpretation of Young Men’s Stories, SEXUALITY RES.
& SOC. POL’Y, June 2007, at 5, 11.
292. Brickell, supra note 290, at 31-32; DeHaan et al., supra note 10, at 431; R.J. Maratea
& Philip R. Kavanaugh, Deviant Identity in Online Contexts: New Directives in the Study of
a Classic Concept, 6 SOC. COMPASS 102, 106-07 (2012) (“[T]he Internet becomes a vehicle to
realize ‘authentic’ identities, which can be particularly important for people who do not
participate in subcultures, scenes, or groups in a face-to-face manner.” (citations omitted)). 
293. See generally OGI OGAS & SAI GADDAM, A BILLION WICKED THOUGHTS: WHAT THE
INTERNET TELLS US ABOUT SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS (2012).
294. See HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 157-59; see also Trevor Scott Milford, Revisiting
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coercion and exploitation online or off, but there is a potentially
overlooked set of benefits.
Two scholars have observed that the Internet has brought about
a “sexual revolution, particularly for disenfranchised groups.”295
People can educate themselves about interests they would not feel
comfortable discussing in their physical communities,296 indulge
those interests within (seemingly) low risk online environments,297
and, again, decide whether to pursue them further. And this deci-
sion is one key takeaway from this scholarship—many people who
engage in Internet-mediated fantasies do not pursue their interests
further,298 either because they realized it was ultimately not for
them or because the self-contained Internet fantasy is fulfilling or
satisfying in and of itself.299 The Internet can certainly be a step-
ping-stone toward a full embrace of a particular sexual identity, but
it can also be a stepping-stone away from an identity or set of
practices that ultimately are not a match.
Relatedly, the Internet is not only a stepping-stone toward or
away from a particular marginalized sexual identity; it can also
provide a safety valve for sexual practices that individuals have
Cyberfeminism: Theory as a Tool for Understanding Young Women’s Experiences, in EGIRLS,
ECITIZENS 65 (Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves eds., 2015) (“Despite the plethora of constraints
and risks articulated in mainstream discourses on gender and virtual expression, girls can
also experience agency and liberation through online self-disclosure.”); Mae C. Quinn, From
Turkey Trot to Twitter: Policing Puberty, Purity, and Sex-Positivity, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 51, 92 (2014) (“Other teenage girls, however, may be embracing electronic media as
[a] place to display their bodies—in various shapes and sizes—as a form of teen sex-
positivity.”).
295. Daneback & Ross, supra note 56, at 121, 128.
296. Brian Simpson, Identity Manipulation in Cyberspace as a Leisure Option: Play and the
Exploration of Self, 14 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 115, 119 (2005).
297. See Daneback & Ross, supra note 56, at 131 (noting, for example, that people can
discuss their desires online without having to actually speak); Richard L. Gilbert et al.,
Sexuality in the 3D Internet and Its Relationship to Real-Life Sexuality, 2 PSYCHOL. &
SEXUALITY 107, 108 (2011) (“Individuals have the ability to explore their sexuality without
the risk of sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy, physical harm or societal judgment.”).
298. See Brickell, supra note 290, at 32; Hillier & Harrison, supra note 289, at 92; Nodin
et al., supra note 290, at 724-25, 730.
299. Brandon Andrew Robinson & David A. Moskowitz, The Eroticism of Internet Cruising
as a Self-Contained Behaviour: A Multivariate Analysis of Men Seeking Men Demographics
and Getting Off Online, 15 CULTURE HEALTH & SEXUALITY 555, 562, 565-66 (2013) (finding
that many men found posting ads and subsequent online exchanges to be erotic in and of
itself).
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no intention of ever acting out offline.300 Particularly, where the
sexual fantasy is criminal, violent, or might unduly disrupt a per-
son’s day-to-day life, several researchers have observed that the
Internet can serve as an outlet or coping mechanism.301 For
example, self-identified heterosexual men have reported satisfaction
from being able to explore same-sex desires solely within the
confines of an online environment.302 A substantial number of men
and women not only report that they have explored bondage,
submission, and rape fantasies online, but also that they have little
desire to pursue those fantasies in their physical sex lives.303
Individuals with a sexual interest in teenagers or even younger
children report using the Internet as a way to cope with these
desires.304 Accessing sexually explicit content is often tightly as-
sociated with sexual violence and the social subordination of
women.305 Some studies have instead shown an inverse relationship
between sexual content and sexual violence—for example, sexual
assault rates have declined over the past thirty years notwithstand-
ing an explosion in available pornography.306 Some scholars have
300. See Daneback & Ross, supra note 56, at 126, 130-31 (explaining that Internet sex can
be an outlet for stress and curiosity about sexual activities people would not pursue offline);
Gilbert et al., supra note 297, at 118 (finding that the results of a study about sexual
explorations in Second Life “indicated that participants viewed their sexuality in the two
realms as largely independent.”); McKenna et al., supra note 17, at 309.
301. See, e.g., Declaration of Park Dietz at 6-7, United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 12-CR-00847), ECF No. 181; see also Daneback & Ross, supra note 56,
at 127-28 (concluding that the vast majority of sexual Internet use is unproblematic); Ross,
supra note 6, at 343 (observing that the Internet allows people to experiment with perversion
without being perverse).
302. Robinson & Moskowitz, supra note 299, at 563-64.
303. See OGAS & GADDAM, supra note 293, at 114, 207-11; Christian C. Joyal et al., What
Exactly Is an Unusual Sexual Fantasy?, 12 J. SEXUAL MED. 328, 338-39 (2015).
304. See David L. Riegel, Letter to the Editor, Effects on Boy-Attracted Pedosexual Males
of Viewing Boy Erotica, 33 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 321, 322 (2004) (“Respondents who wrote
comments almost invariably stated that such viewing actually sublimated and redirected their
sexual energies away from attempted or actual sexual contact with boys and, as a result, they
felt less rather than more inclined to seek out boys for sexual gratification.”). This should not
be read as an endorsement for pornography involving real children, given the high risk of
sexual exploitation associated with its production.
305. See MACKINNON, supra note 213, at 20-23; Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:
Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9-17 (1985).
306. See William A. Fisher et al., Pornography, Sex Crime, and Paraphilia, 15 CURRENT
PSYCHIATRY REP., no. 362, 2013, at 3. (“[I]n the context of very widespread and unfettered
access to essentially all types of sexually explicit materials, rates of sex crime, indexed in a
variety of ways, have not increased and may have decreased.”); Hessick, supra note 36, at 877
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credited this counterintuitive trend to a “catharsis” effect of expe-
riencing sexual violence virtually.307
Lastly, the Internet can provide access to a community of other
people sharing similar sexual desires.308 Possessing and working
through nonnormative sexual desires can be extremely isolating,
and the Internet can provide opportunities to connect with other
people and obtain some emotional support for desires with which
friends, family, or coworkers may be unlikely to sympathize.309 In
the words of one scholar, “for some people, internet communication
may be not a luxury, but a lifeline.”310 Much of the literature on this
notion of online sexual communities has focused on LGBT persons,
and particularly LGBT teens seeking support both from other teens
struggling with similar sexuality issues and from LGBT adults who
have experience working through those issues.311 But online sexual
communities are not limited to LGBT interests, and exist for a
tremendous range of desires. For example, BDSM websites like
& nn.93-96 (collecting studies).
307. Fisher, supra note 306, at 6 (reviewing studies).
308. GRAY, supra note 62, at 121-40; Harper et al., supra note 50, at 302-04; Hill, supra
note 56, at 28-32.
309. See JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM
SEX 148 (2002) (“On the Web, the lonely can get fast companionship; the clueless, com-
passionate, nonmoralistic support and crucial practical help.”); Hill, supra note 56, at 24, 28,
39-42 (“I realized, yes, this was a whole group of transvestites and transexuals talking to each
other.”(quoting Interview with Miggi, study participant)); Hillier & Harrison, supra note 289,
at 90 (“I have not been exposed to gay people through my family and seeing there are gays all
over the world really takes the loneliness away. I’m not the only one, there are others like me
and they are living a great life.” (quoting Interview with Amber, 21, study participant));
Pingel et al., supra note 7, at 462 (“It made me feel a little less alone.” (quoting Interview with
Peter, 24, white, single, study participant)); Ross, supra note 6, at 349 (“For those with the
greatest sexual isolation, cybersex may constitute a community of support and identification,
support in the sense that it provides them with a sense that they are not alone.”); Thomas et
al., supra note 291, at 8 (“[T]hat’s the first time I think I felt that it wasn’t a defect. That
there’s a lot of people out there who feel the same way that I do.”(quoting Interview with Eric,
study participant)).
310. Ross, supra note 6, at 349.
311. See Hillier & Harrison, supra note 289, at 94 (“[M]any young people turn to the
internet to look for role models and information about gay culture and to try out their same-
sex attractions among similar others in an internet-based community.”); Simpson, supra note
296, at 122 (noting that “virtual peers” online are not necessarily the same age); Thomas et
al., supra note 291, at 9 (“Online friends served as a source of strength and support,
particularly for those whose living situations (with parents or in rural communities or both)
limited their opportunity to meet gay men offline.”).
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FetLife.com, mentioned in the custody law context,312 emphasize the
importance of community and acceptance of members as they are.313
Professor Margo Kaplan has also written about websites dedicated
to adults with pedophilic desires seeking to help each other cope
with pedophilia and avoid actual sexual contact with children.314
Particularly when the sexual desire is deeply stigmatized, feelings
of social isolation can make it more likely that an individual will act
upon those desires, and the Internet can provide some needed
intervention for individuals lacking or fearing other potential social
outlets.315 This is not to deny the potential for online communities
to reinforce unhealthy behavioral patterns; online communities
formed around sexual taboos also can provide, at the very least in
the short-term, a network of emotional support not otherwise avail-
able.316 Online communities are wildly varied in form, and, like all
forms of communities, hold the potential to both foster and inhibit
the emotional and physical well-being of their members.317 
The practice of harshly punishing sexual fantasy online deters
people from using the Internet to figure out their desires and con-
nect with potential communities of support. Most directly, it sends
a strong signal to adults both to steer clear of any sexual conversa-
tions with minors and to be highly skeptical that anyone claiming
to be a minor actually is one. This wedge between teenagers and
adults online318 may be particularly troubling for LGBT youth, who
312. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
313. See FETLIFE, http://Fetlife.com [https://perma.cc/Y832-53N9] (quoting user “shy_
but_sassy” as saying “Great website. I have been checking out facebook but I have to keep it
somewhat neutral as vanilla family and friends are there. Its [sic] great to have somewhere
to go where you don’t have to hide anything”); see also Maratea & Kavanaugh, supra note 292,
at 104 (describing the “emergence of collegial online communities” akin to “deviant
subcultures” through which participants can “dispense advice, provide empathy, and network”
regarding similar taboo sexual interests, such as zoophilia).
314. See Kaplan, supra note 202, at 77-78.
315. See id. at 95 (“Experts and individuals living with pedophilia agree that isolation and
lack of support is a serious obstacle for the prevention of sexual abuse.”).
316. See Maratea & Kavanaugh, supra note 292, at 104-05 (collecting studies observing
behavioral reinforcement patterns in pro-anorexia and self-harm websites).
317. See, e.g., Keith Durkin et al., Pathological Internet Communities: A New Direction for
Sexual Deviance Research in a Post Modern Era, 26 SOC. SPECTRUM 595, 603 (2006)
(emphasizing the need for more research about the catharsis/support versus reinforcement
effects of online sexual communities).
318. See generally Fairfield, supra note 48 (describing efforts to segregate adults and
minors online).
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have repeatedly reported valuable mentoring relationships online,319
and who are significantly more likely to have had sexually themed
conversations with adults.320
This wedge, however, is unlikely to actually keep teenagers and
adults apart; teenagers often do not turn away in the face of age
restrictions—they simply lie, vitiating any certainty that eighteen
and older forums are safe spaces for adults to have sexually charged
conversations.321 Moreover, given the potential for anyone’s online
sex life to be used as evidence of negative moral fitness or as
predisposition for a range of criminal activity, the legal system
dissuades candor in otherwise potentially supportive online forums.
The result of all these effects is to strip sexual encounters in the
digital realm of one key component of both intimacy and community:
trust.322 Adults should be wary of communicating with minors,
minors should be wary of adults expressing an interest in their
lives, and everyone should be wary about their online sex life
making its way into the courtroom. 
C. Distorting the Data
It might be argued that, even if there is some potential upside to
allowing individuals space to explore their sexual desires online,
this benefit is heavily outweighed by the pronounced risk of sexual
harm and predation. Although law enforcement certainly should
take allegations and suspicions of sexual violence seriously—and
319. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
320. See generally Michele L. Ybarra & Kimberly J. Mitchell, A National Study of Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual (LGB), and Non-LGB Youth Sexual Behavior Online and In-Person, 45 AR-
CHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1352, 1361 (2016).
321. See Pingel et al., supra note 7, at 461 (“Rather than age acting as a barrier, young men
reveled in the freedom that accompanied lying about one’s age.”); id. at 474 (“The lack of
appropriate spaces meant that some YGM [young gay men] entered sites nominally reserved
for those over eighteen.”). Misrepresenting age in order to access a computer network
potentially raises additional legal concerns under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. See
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856, 858, 862-64 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
322. See HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 79 (“[PSA ads] cast[ ]men as skilled predators and
position[ ] girls as innocent dupes who need to educate and empower themselves to change
their online interactions. In other words, they need to learn to distrust online relationships.”);
Simpson, supra note 296, at 123 (noting that trust is an important aspect of using the Internet
for identity management); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information
in a Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 590, 613, 616, 621 (2015).
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there are well-documented examples of police and school adminis-
trators failing to do so—several scholars have emphasized that the
“vexing problem of Internet predation”323 is statistically a much
smaller threat to minors’ health and safety than suggested by legal,
political, and cultural discourse.324 The goal here is not to deny that
Internet-mediated sexual assault is a real problem; the goal is to
show that legal responses have poorly mapped onto the real-world
dynamics of the problem.
 For example, Professor Allegra McLeod has criticized the
distorted statistical risks around online sexual predators; for in-
stance, only 3 percent of reported sexual abuse conforms to the
“stranger danger” narrative dominating legal discussions of child
sexual abuse.325 This distortion has channeled resources away from
the vast majority of sex crimes, which are perpetrated by family and
community members.326 Indeed, she emphasized that there was no
meaningful correlation between the target of Internet sting op-
erations and actual child abuse.327
Similarly, Professor Margo Kaplan has noted that the dominant
narrative of sexual predators falsely equates sexual assault with
sexual desires. For example, she noted that most sexual assaults
against children have not been perpetrated by persons with pedo-
philia.328 Furthermore, when Internet sex-related arrests involved
an actual child (as opposed to an undercover officer), most involved
consensual, statutory rape scenarios, and not the abduction and
coerced sex scenarios commonly envisioned in law and popular cul-
ture.329 Teenagers’ age and experience certainly create an important
323. United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 65 (1st Cir. 2007).
324. Janis Wolak et al., Online Predators: Myth Versus Reality, 25 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y,
no. 6, 2013, at 1, 2 (“Overall, our research about Internet-initiated sex crimes indicates that
the stereotype of the Internet ‘predator’ is largely inaccurate.”); Ybarra & Mitchell, supra note
320, at 1368 (“Health professionals should be encouraged that the Internet is not fostering
exploitative relationships for the vast majority of youth.”).
325. McLeod, supra note 12, at 1568-71; accord Hessick, supra note 36, at 887 (“One of the
most pervasive misperceptions about child sex abuse is that it is a crime perpetrated by
strangers.”).
326. McLeod, supra note 12, at 1573.
327. Id.
328. Kaplan, supra note 202, at 87 (“Indeed, the majority of child sex offenders do not have
a strong or dominant sexual interest in children.”).
329. EWING, supra note 243, at 200 (explaining that data on Internet-mediated sex abuse
suggest that it is primarily in the form of statutory rape); Wolak et al., supra note 324, at 1-2.
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set of vulnerabilities, but they are rarely coerced or duped into
traumatic sexual encounters as presumed by the stranger danger
myth.330 
Scholars danah boyd331 and Amy Hasinoff both have similarly
pushed back against the false narrative surrounding social media
and sexuality, particularly in relation to teenagers.332 boyd’s work
has involved extensive interviews with teenagers about how and
why they spend so much time on social media,333 and Hasinoff ’s
work looks specifically at the rise of teen sexting and the accompa-
nying moral panic.334 Rather than framing teenagers’ Internet and
social media use solely in terms of sexual innocence and potential
victimization, each has shown the complexity of the relationship
between youth and emerging technology. Teenagers use networked
technologies in order to make connections with both old and new
friends and to explore identities and desires (whether related to
sexuality or the newest One Direction single) in ways they are often
unable to in the midst of increasingly structured, overscheduled
physical lives.335 In sustaining connections with offline friends,
exploring new or existing intimate relationships, and complying
with the demands of families and schools, teenagers do indeed
struggle to maintain boundaries between their various online social
spheres.336 But research shows that the collapse of these spheres—
for example, through bullying or dissemination of sexted images—is
not a result of the Internet’s inherent danger but instead a byprod-
uct of teenagers’ attempted assertions of social and sexual agency.337
330. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 113 (“Even in cases in which the perpetrator was not
someone that the victim initially knew, the perpetrator rarely deceived the teen....
Surprisingly, many teens were more deceptive about their age, intentionally portraying
themselves as older.”).
331. See supra note 48 (explaining capitalization).
332. See generally BOYD, supra note 48; HASINOFF, supra note 38.
333. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 84-93.
334. See HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 1-3.
335. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 84-93 (“When teens engage with networked media, they’re
trying to take control of their lives and their relationship to society.”); see also HASINOFF,
supra note 38, at 118 (suggesting that teenagers use sexting as a way “to maintain an
intimate sexual copresence that reaffirms attraction and affection while the two partners are
physically apart”).
336. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 49-53, 59-61; HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 135 (“[Y]oung
people often view privacy in terms of maintaining control over who (friends, parents, or
teachers, for example) has access to their information.”).
337. See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 48, at 98 (“Most youth aren’t turning to social media
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Teenagers are certainly at risk for sexual exploitation online, but
these online risks often track the profile of teenagers at risk offline,
such as LGBT teens or teens struggling with drugs and alcohol.338
Accordingly, approaching teen sexuality online solely through the
lenses of criminalization and victimization misconceives and harsh-
ly punishes teenagers’ imperfect attempts at boundary management
and sexual agency, while distracting from teenagers’ most pressing
actual vulnerabilities.339 
Many published legal opinions may indeed document instances of
adult men seeking to sexually engage with “minors,” but again these
arrests and convictions are fueled by chat room sting operations in
all fifty states340 and a large corps of volunteer citizen decoys.341 For
example, sixteen published decisions mention sting operations in an
AOL chat room labeled “I Love Older Men.”342 In exactly zero of
because they can’t resist the lure of technology. They’re responding to a social world in which
adults watch and curtail their practices and activities, justifying their protectionism as being
necessary for safety.”); see also HASINOFF, supra note 38, at 12 (“The problem with assuming
that all girls who sext are passive victims is that it becomes difficult to recognize or
understand girls’ choices.... [T]he dominant discourse about girls tend to entirely erase their
capacity for agency in sexual decisions.”); Simpson, supra note 296, at 120-21 (observing that
children use the Internet to actively explore their identities and transgress expected norms
of gender, sexual preference, and childhood more generally).
338. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 113 (“[T]eens who are struggling in everyday life also
engage in problematic encounters online.”); see also JANIS WOLAK ET AL., CRIMES AGAINST
CHILDREN RES. CTR., TRENDS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED
CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION CRIMES: THE THIRD NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION
STUDY 4 (2012), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV268_Trends%20in%20LE%20Response%20
Bulletin_4-13-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MBH-S4GH]; Wolak et al., supra note 324, at 5-7.
339. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 114 (“What’s needed to combat grooming, deception, and
abduction rape is very different than what’s needed to address the underlying issues that
motivate a young person to engage in risky sexual encounters.”); HASINOFF, supra note 38, at
12 (“Pushing past the attractively simple explanations that sexualization in media, or raging
hormones, or low self-esteem causes sexting opens up spaces for thinking about the
complexity of girls’ agency.”); id. at 105 (“At the very least, the existing data suggest that the
vast majority of teenage sexts are shared consensually among peers.... Nonetheless, many
online safety campaigns and advertisements dramatize the relatively unlikely scenario of a
middle-aged online predator viewing a girl’s private sexual image.”).
340. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Forces in All 50 States (Oct. 15, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2007/October/07_ojp_061.html [https://perma.cc/V2Q9-RTHU].
341. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated by United
States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2011); PERVERTED JUSTICE, http://www.perverted-
justice.com [https://perma.cc/P8G3-X85K] (website of volunteer decoys for child-sex stings).
342. See Joseph, 542 F.3d at 14; United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.
2007); United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 65, 66 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[D]efendant-
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these cases did the prosecution begin with an adult speaking with
an actual minor—every one involved a police officer or adult
volunteer pretending to be a teenage girl. This is not to say that
these chat rooms never contain adults who have previously molested
children;343 it is to say, again, that it is rare for adults to meet a
victim for the first time in these forums.344 And, again, it is even
rarer for minors to be unwittingly duped or deceived into having
unwanted sexual experiences with adult strangers.345 It is, however,
common for adults to meet other adults pretending to be children,
devoting many hours of their lives to extended, extremely graphic
conversations about illegal sexual acts.
The practice of punishing sexual fantasy ultimately creates a
dangerous feedback loop. The more that individuals are sent to jail
or registered as sex offenders or restricted access to their families,
the more it appears that the Internet is a “hotbed of illegal activ-
ity”346 in which huge numbers of men lure, pursue, and sexually
assault women and children they would never otherwise meet.347
appellant Matthew Dwinells engaged in extensive Internet contact with three different
correspondents thought to be teenage girls. In fact, the ‘girls’ were histrionic law enforcement
officers.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2006); United
States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2004) (defendant contacted four different
police officers in AOL chat room), vacated, 543 U.S. 1136 (2005), reinstated, 144 Fed. App’x
804 (2005); United States v. Johnson, 376 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Raney, 342 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 554 (7th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002); Liedke v. United
States, No. 08 CR 653, 2015 WL 4111561, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015); United States v.
DeWoody, 226 F. Supp. 2d 956, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2002); People v. Crabtree, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41,
50 (Ct. App. 2009); People v. Dean, No. B192974, 2008 WL 376226, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
13, 2008); Sirota v. State, 95 So. 3d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Bower, No.
2005CA00015, 2005 WL 1983966, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005); State v. Lawhun, No.
15-03-02, 2003 WL 21904798, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2003); cf. United States v.
D’Amelio, 565 Fed. App’x 61, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The Government’s evidence showed that he
initiated contact with ‘Mary,’ who told him that she was a 12-year-old girl, in a chatroom
entitled ‘I Love Much Older Men.’”); United States v. Chriswell, 401 F.3d 459, 460 (6th Cir.
2005) (involving Yahoo! chat room “I Love Older Men”).
343. See, e.g., Crabtree, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 48-53 (discussing defendant’s various charges,
including offenses against both minors he knew previously and adult decoys he contacted in
chat rooms).
344. See, e.g., Richard Tewksbury & Jill Levenson, When Evidence Is Ignored: Residential
Restrictions for Sex Offenders, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 2007, at 55-56.
345. Wolak et al., supra note 324, at 2.
346. Brand, 467 F.3d at 202.
347. For example, in a study conducted by danah boyd and her colleagues, 93 percent of
parents were concerned about their children being harmed by strangers they met, even
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And this misperception about online predators fuels a range of
investigatory strategies designed to root out any exploration of
online fantasy that plays into the dominant, stranger danger
narrative. For example, between 2000 and 2006, arrests of offenders
who solicited undercover investigators posing as youths increased
381 percent, while the number of arrests involving actual youths
remained largely unchanged; indeed, in 2006, 87 percent of solic-
itation arrests involved undercover investigators.348 Moreover, 89
percent of arrestees in these undercover arrests ended up registered
as sex offenders.349 The problem with chat room stings is not that
the legal system should be unconcerned about the spillover from
fantasy into the real world; the problem is that the government is
actively trying to push fantasy into the real world based upon a
mistaken belief that this spillover is inevitable. And this mistaken
belief about the risks of online predation has itself spilled over into
a legal system profoundly suspicious of and often outright hostile to
uncomfortable manifestations of Internet-mediated sexuality.
Families are split up, children are arrested, and many lives are
effectively destroyed by a widely held, and deeply mistaken, con-
flation of sexual desire and harm.350 
Which raises the question: What end does the practice of punish-
ing sexual fantasy serve? Allegra McLeod suggests that the legal
system’s harsh treatment of sex offenders serves a scapegoating
function for our anxieties about sexual desire and harm.351 By
though only 1 percent reported that this had actually happened to their children. See BOYD,
supra note 48, at 109; see also WRIGHT, supra note 202, at 139 (describing Internet sex stings
as “crime-control theater” which “generate[s] the appearance but not the fact of crime control”
(quoting Timothy Griffin & Monica K. Miller, Child Abduction, AMBER Alert, and Crime
Control Theater, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 159, 167 (2008))).
348. Wolak et al., supra note 324, at 4. After 2006, law enforcement activity shifted
somewhat away from chat room stings and towards less time-intensive child pornography
crimes. See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 338, at 2.
349. Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Investigators Using the Internet to Apprehend Sex
Offenders: Findings from the Second National Juvenile Online Victimization Study, 13 POLICE
PRAC. & RES. 267, 275 (2015). Moreover, only 4 percent of these arrestees had any previous
history of sex offending against a minor. Id. at 274 tbl.2.
350. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
351. McLeod, supra note 12, at 1562-63; see also EMILY HOROWITZ, PROTECTING OUR KIDS?
HOW SEX OFFENDER LAWS ARE FAILING US, at  xi (2015) (“We punish sex offenders so harshly,
I believe, because it makes us feel as if we are helping children and protecting them, allowing
us to avoid considering the ugly and depressing facts of widespread (and growing) problems
of child poverty, child homelessness, and child hunger.”).
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focusing time, money, and labor on eradicating online stranger
danger and rounding up a sizeable, yet manageable, population of
sexual predators, we can claim to meaningfully address sexual harm
and the eroticization of sexual violence.352 These efforts, however,
falsely hold out the promise of an easy fix—they target a tiny
portion of actual instances of sexual abuse and single out only a tiny
sliver of individuals who fantasize about sexual violence353 or sex
with minors.354 
The cases surveyed in Part II highlight the unraveling, unsus-
tainable nature of scapegoating taboo sexual desire. As more and
more of our culture’s sexual desires are recorded online and in
digital media, it becomes increasingly difficult to claim that only a
small minority of criminals are turned on by “immoral” sexual acts,
or to equate that desire with a meaningful risk of harmful sexual
activity. Sexual fantasy is becoming increasingly transparent across
several areas of our legal system and making its way into the
capillaries of procedure and evidence. It is deeply important for
lawyers, lawmakers, law enforcement, scholars, and jurists to en-
gage more directly and honestly with the uncomfortable realities of
sexual fantasy and its ambiguous connection to real-world violence
and coercion.
Punishing sexual fantasy no more than marginally protects
children from the pursuits of online strangers, while at the same
time it both diverts attention away from common sources of sexual
abuse and limits opportunities for young people to explore and
352. See McLeod, supra note 12, at 1620-21.
353. See, e.g., Joyal et al., supra note 303, at 338 (“Among women, it was found that [sexual
fantasy] of being dominated, being spanked or whipped, being tied up, and being forced to
have sex were reported by 30%-60%, confirming several studies conducted largely with college
students.”); id. at 334 tbl.2.
354. For example, the drafters of the AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013), rejected proposals to add “hebephilia” as a new
psychiatric condition to describe adult sexual attraction to adolescents. See Allen J. Frances,
DSM 5 Rejects ‘Hebephilia’ Except for the Fine Print, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 3, 2012),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201205/dsm-5-rejects-hebephilia-
except-the-fine-print [https://perma.cc/4ZUH-4R2G]. Numerous psychiatric studies have
shown that adult male attraction to postpubescent teenagers (in other words, those often
involved in chat room stings) is extremely common and has long been understood as psycho-
logically normal, even if actual sex with minors is justifiably criminal. See OGAS & GADDAM,
supra note 293, at 16-17 (observing that the most frequent sex-related search terms involve
an interest in “youth”); Karen Franklin, Hebephilia: Quintessence of Diagnostic Pretextuality,
28 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 751, 754-61 (2010); Kaplan, supra note 202, at 88.
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define their own identities.355 Moreover, many of the vulnerable
individuals ostensibly protected by the practices of punishing sexual
fantasy—teenagers, women, and sexual minorities—are frequently
the very individuals whose sexual desires offend the common sense
of judges, juries, and law enforcement. The end result is therefore
not “protection” of innocent children in any meaningful sense but
instead a channeling of vulnerable youth away from the seemingly
corrupting influences of both alternative perspectives on sexuality
and their own nascent sexual agency.356 By punishing sexual fan-
tasy, the legal system goes to great lengths to prevent adults from
communicating with other people’s children, disfavors parents who
might challenge conventional sexual morality, and sanctions youth
for exploring their own sexuality while still under the authority of
parents, schools, and the state.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND THE PATH FORWARD
There is no silver bullet solution that will solve the problems
outlined above. The problems surrounding punishing sexual fantasy
involve multiple actors, in multiple settings, touching on multiple
bodies of law. Indeed, the survey above cannot possibly encompass
all potential areas of law that may be forced to confront recorded
evidence of sexual fantasy and desire—employment, public benefits,
and probation immediately come to mind as additional areas of
potential friction. What is needed instead—and what this Article
has primarily aimed to provide—is an awareness of the common
misperceptions that link together these diverse practices: conflation
of desire with intent; undue faith in “common sense”; and regulating
sex and technology based upon fear and not empirical data.
What to do with this awareness will ultimately be contextual and
may or may not be strictly “legal” in form. My hope is that when
confronted with evidence of sexual fantasy, legal actors will reorient
355. See supra Part III.B.
356. See Brian Simpson, From Family First to the FBI: Children, Ideology, and Cyberspace,
15 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 239, 241 (2006) (“[T]he issue of children’s capacity in Cyberspace
becomes intertwined with many ‘adult’ agendas connected to what is considered to be the
‘proper’ family, the role of women and children in society and notions of ‘appropriate’
morality.”); see also id. at 254 (“[T]he Internet is constructed as a place which is a threat to
family life.”).
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themselves away from a knee-jerk embrace of common sense and
towards evidentiary and procedural strategies that respect the
complexities of sexual identity and desire. Neil Richards has
similarly observed that in order to adequately protect intellectual
privacy, it is not just a matter of adjusting First Amendment
doctrine; instead, it is a matter of recognizing free speech values
that make their way through various capillaries of legal process—
evidentiary rules, discovery limits, privileges, standards of reviews,
and expert testimony.357 Accordingly, I conclude by suggesting an
assemblage of potential reforms, aimed at rooting out and address-
ing some of the cultural and institutional structures that further
the practices of punishing sexual fantasy.
The cases surveyed above show a few relatively straightforward
ways to disrupt the reinforcing logic of “common sense.” First, when
cases involving sexual fantasy make it to trial, expert testimony
might provide an effective, if imperfect,358 counterbalance to the
“common sense” surrounding the dangers of the Internet and sex.359
In the “Cannibal Cop” case, for example, the trial judge denied a
motion to exclude expert testimony about violent sexual fantasy and
online sexual subcultures.360 Nonetheless, the defense opted against
putting these experts on the stand, the prosecution repeatedly asked
jurors to invoke common sense, and they obliged with a guilty ver-
dict.361 In Valle’s posttrial briefing, however, he included a letter
from forensic psychiatrist, Park Dietz, emphasizing the crucial dis-
tinctions between sexual fantasy and sexual action and the common
357. See Richards, supra note 236, at 428 (“First Amendment values are broader than
doctrine; they are the goals and policies which animate it, and represent our aspirations for
the kind of free society we want to live in. The answer to the problem lies in building First
Amendment values ... into other legal and social structures.”).
358. See, e.g., Libby Adler, Just the Facts: The Perils of Expert Testimony and Findings of
Fact in Gay Rights Litigation, 7 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1 (2011).
359. See, e.g., United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1167-70 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing
inclusion of psychiatrist expert testimony in a “fantasy-only” defense); United States v.
Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that the district court had no ground
to bar a psychologist from testifying about his opinions about defendant’s “character
pathology” and Internet gratification); United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 72-74 (1st Cir.
2007) (discussing sufficiency of evidence for jury to determine whether defendant actually
intended to entice minor).
360. See United States v. Valle, No. 12-CR-0847, 2013 WL 440687, at *8, *10 (S.D.N.Y Feb.
2, 2013).
361. See Johnson & Gilden, supra note 4, at 319-20.
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use of the Internet to explore sexual fantasies.362 Although it is
impossible to know just how much this view influenced Judge
Gardephe’s decision to overturn the verdict, other cases involving
online sexual fantasy show that defendants have benefited greatly
from the introduction of expert testimony or have been imperiled by
its exclusion.363
A related approach is to impose greater oversight of jury decision-
making. Jurors appear particularly susceptible to the dangers of
“common sense”—indeed they often are relied upon in fact-finding
precisely because they are seen as a proxy for common sense.364 But,
in the realm of Internet-mediated sexuality, there is a profound
disconnect between the commonsense stranger danger narratives
and the realities of both sexual abuse and online sexual explora-
tions.365 Heavy deference to juries in this realm insulates common-
sense fear and misinformation, even in the face of substantial evi-
dence placing intent, conspiracy, or predisposition in doubt. Indeed,
many of the cases outlined in Part II acknowledge the viability of a
failed fantasy defense. 
By contrast, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in the “Cannibal
Cop” case emphasizes that jurors do not have free reign to draw
specious inferences from evidence of Internet fantasy, nor are they
free to convict based on “some evidence” of criminal intent.366
Although it may seem problematic for judges to reweigh evidence
considered by the jury, judges appear to be more sensitive to “the
line between fantasy and criminal intent” and the increasing chal-
lenge of identifying it “in the Internet age.”367 Jurors sitting in a
single trial, by contrast, appear less likely to be sensitive to this
increasingly important challenge and are more likely to be swayed
by a sense of disgust or revulsion.368 Greater scrutiny posttrial and
on appeal may help address the dangers of overly deferring to juror
common sense, as would clearer and more specific jury instructions
about the need to distinguish fantasy from intent. 
362. Id. at 325-26.
363. See, e.g., Hite, 769 F.3d at 1167-70; United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d
Cir. 2008), abrogated by United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2011).
364. Johnson & Gilden, supra note 4, at 322-23.
365. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
366. Valle, 807 F.3d at 522-23.
367. Id. at 511.
368. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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In addition, certain evidentiary and discovery limits could help
better contextualize sexually explicit online conversations. As
statements of the party-opponent, these conversations are easily
admissible at trial, but they take on a very different, and potentially
quite prejudicial, meaning when transferred from the chat room to
the courtroom. Most straightforwardly, it is crucial for courts to
more evenly apply character propensity rules in the context of
sexual fantasy—it should be far more difficult for prosecutors to
make the highly questionable leap from what turns a person on to
what they actually intended to do.369 The admissibility of sexual
fantasy evidence runs afoul of traditional Rule 404 justifications
(that is, you should be held liable for what you actually did during
relevant time period) with the additional concern that admitting
such evidence may dissuade or chill individuals from pursuing the
potentially therapeutic benefits of online fantasy.370 As a corollary
to the limited relevance and heavy prejudice of sexual fantasy
evidence, discovery of an individual’s online fantasy life should be
tightly constrained to avoid sexual matters disconnected from the
alleged misdeed at hand.371
Lastly, there may be some role for more explicit First Amendment
protections in recognition of the concerns highlighted above. For
example, Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, in her work on overcrim-
inalizing speech, suggests allowing opportunities to challenge gen-
erally applicable law as content-based as applied: “When a statute
punishes speech because the harms are caused by the persuasive,
informative, or offensive elements of the opinions expressed, that
statute should be treated as a content-based restriction on speech
and therefore subject to full-fledged First Amendment scrutiny.”372
Other ways of incorporating more explicit free speech values might
369. See Richards, supra note 236, at 443 (“But evidence of fantasies should be
inadmissible, as should the use of reading habits to establish motive or intent, for all of the
unreliability and First Amendment reasons discussed earlier.”).
370. Cf. id. at 442 (“The introduction of our reading habits into evidence not only makes
public these private cognitive processes, but also threatens to chill others in the future from
engaging in the unfettered act of reading.”).
371. I acknowledge, though, that in cases like the “Cannibal Cop,” the online discussions
among the alleged coconspirators will need to be discoverable to show the existence of the
conspiracy itself. But other images, stories, and transcripts concerning “dark fetishes” are
likely to bear far less heavily on the central question of guilt/liability. 
372. Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 122, at 1711.
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include reading a subjective intent requirement into a statute when
it imposes liability for fantasy-related activities,373 or requiring the
prosecution or plaintiff to demonstrate a foreseeable likelihood of
harm from these activities.374 
Judicial intervention, however, is only a partial solution to
counteracting the trend of punishing sexual fantasy. Much of the
punishment occurs outside the courtroom—for example, threats of
prosecution, pretrial detention, or reputational damage from
negative publicity.375 Accordingly, it is crucial to better educate law
enforcement, prosecutors, and policymakers about the potential
social benefits of the activities they are monitoring before disturbing
the lives of people who pose little risk to others.376 One potentially
fruitful entry point for reform is the Department of Justice’s
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Program (ICAC),377
which provides substantial funding and extensive training to a
nationwide network of federal, state, and local law enforcement.378
It is crucial that ICAC’s training on investigating Internet-facili-
tated crimes against children incorporate some acknowledgment
373. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011-12 (2015) (imposing a
subjective intent requirement on prosecutions for transmitting a threat in interstate
commerce, in order to separate out innocent, accidental Internet posting from purposeful,
wrongful threats).
374. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 122, at 1723-28 (proposing a “substantial
probability of harm” test for endangerment speech crimes). In the copyright law context, I
similarly have proposed refocusing fair use defenses on both the defendant’s subjective intent
and the foreseeable harm from his actions, in order to better align copyright with the First
Amendment. See Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355,
399-400 (2016).
375. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51 (2015)
(discussing formal and informal governmental pressures placed on Internet platforms and
their varied dimensions of authority and compulsion).
376. I suspect that law enforcement training will in many ways respond to developments
in the case law with respect to Internet-mediated sexuality. For example, after the Second
Circuit’s decision in Valle, law enforcement will need to adjust its investigatory techniques
to better ensure that a defendant did in fact take steps to carry out the sexual scenarios he
or she discussed online.
377. See Program Summary, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
http://www.ojjdp.gov/programs/progsummary.asp?pi=3 [https://perma.cc/YS94-BD7K].
378. Most of the training programs available through ICAC and its affiliates are restricted
access for law enforcement only, making it difficult to assess the extent to which, if at all, any
of the concerns expressed in this Article about online sexual fantasy are being conveyed to law
enforcement trainees. This is a fruitful area for future research.
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and respect for the speech and privacy interests of the adults and
minors under investigation.
Ultimately, as digital networks become an increasingly central
backbone of contemporary society, the legal system will need to
reckon with the complexities of our intimate lives and the uncom-
fortable curiosities of the human mind. The Internet has enabled
countless numbers of people to explore their horizons, inhabit ways-
of-being that otherwise appeared off-limits, and make connections
outside the physical, emotional, and moral constraints of their local
communities. And when these online explorations have empowered
individuals to proudly and openly move forward with their lives in
respectable, dignified ways, the legal system has come to recognize
their rights to “define and express their identity.”379 But, in re-
specting the public manifestations of sexual identity—regardless of
sexual orientation—it is crucial to remember that a lot is going on
behind the scenes. The Internet brings to the surface the inherent
messiness of identity and our continued anxieties about giving each
other some extra space to play.
379. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
